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Abstract
Belief change is a fundamental problem in AI: Agents constantly have to update
their beliefs to accommodate new observations. In recent years, there has been
much work on axiomatic characterizations of belief change. We claim that a better
understanding of belief change can be gained from examining appropriate semantic
models. In this paper we propose a general framework in which to model belief
change. We begin by defining belief in terms of knowledge and plausibility: an agent
believes φ if he knows that φ is more plausible than ¬φ. We then consider some
properties defining the interaction between knowledge and plausibility, and show
how these properties affect the properties of belief. In particular, we show that
by assuming two of the most natural properties, belief becomes a KD45 operator.
Finally, we add time to the picture. This gives us a framework in which we can
talk about knowledge, plausibility (and hence belief), and time, which extends the
framework of Halpern and Fagin for modeling knowledge in multi-agent systems.
We then examine the problem of “minimal change”. This notion can be captured by
using prior plausibilities, an analogue to prior probabilities, which can be updated
by “conditioning”. We show by example that conditioning on a plausibility measure
can capture many scenarios of interest. In a companion paper, we show how the two
best-studied scenarios of belief change, belief revision and belief update, fit into our
framework.
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1 Introduction
In order to act in the world we must make assumptions, such as “the corridor is clear” or
“my car is parked where I left it”. These assumptions, however, are defeasible. We can easily
imagine situations where the corridor is blocked, or where the car is stolen. We call the
logical consequences of such defeasible assumptions beliefs. As time passes, we constantly
obtain new information that might cause us to make additional assumptions or withdraw
some of our previous assumptions. The problem of belief change is to understand how beliefs
should change.
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and in artificial intelli-
gence [Ga¨r88,KM91a]. In the literature, two instances of this general phenomenon have been
studied in detail: Belief revision [AGM85,Ga¨r88] attempts to describe how an agent should
accommodate a new belief (possibly inconsistent with his other beliefs) about a static world.
Belief update [KM91a], on the other hand, attempts to describe how an agent should change
his beliefs as a result of learning about a change in the world. Belief revision and belief update
describe only two of the many ways in which beliefs can change. Our goal is to construct a
framework to reason about belief change in general. This paper describes the details of that
framework. In a companion paper [FH97a] we consider the special cases of belief revision
and update in more detail.
Perhaps the most straightforward approach to belief change is to simply represent an agent’s
beliefs as a closed set of formulas in some language and then put constraints on how these
beliefs can change. This is essentially the approach taken in [AGM85,Ga¨r88,KM91a]; as their
results show, much can be done with this framework. The main problem with this approach
is that it does not provide a good semantics for belief. As we hope to show in this paper
and in [FH97a], such a semantics can give us a much deeper understanding of how and why
beliefs change. Moreover, this semantics provides the tools to deal with complicating factors
such actions, external events, and multiple agents.
One standard approach to giving semantics to beliefs is to put a preference ordering on
the set of worlds that the agent considers possible. Intuitively, such an ordering captures
the relative likelihood of worlds. Various authors [Bou92,GP92,KM91a,Spo88] have then
interpreted “the agent believes φ” as “φ is true in the most plausible worlds that the agent
considers possible”. An alternative approach is to put a probability measure over the set
of possible worlds. Then we can interpret “the agent believes φ” as “the probability of φ is
close to 1” [Pea89]. We examine a new approach to modeling uncertainty based on plausibility
measures, introduced in [FH95,FH97b], where a plausibility measure just associates with an
event (i.e., a set of possible worlds) its plausibility, an element in some partially ordered set.
This approach is easily seen to generalize other approaches to modeling uncertainty, such
in Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, 1994,
pp. 44-64, under the title “A knowledge-based framework for belief change, Part I: Foundations”.
This version is almost identical to one that will appear in Artificial Intelligence.
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as probability measures, belief functions, and preference orderings. We interpret the “agent
believes φ” as “the plausibility of φ is greater than that of ¬φ”. As we show, this is often
(but not always) equivalent to “φ is true in the most plausible worlds”.
By modeling beliefs in this way, there is an assumption that the plausibility measure is part of
the agent’s epistemic state. (This assumption is actually made explicitly in [Bou92,KLM90].)
This implies that the plausibility measure is subjective, that is, it describes the agent’s
estimate of the plausibility of each event. But actually, an even stronger assumption is
being made: namely, that the agent’s epistemic state is characterized by a single plausibility
measure. We feel that this latter assumption makes the models less expressive than they
ought to be. In particular, they cannot represent a situation where the agent is not sure
about what is plausible, such as “Alice does not know that it typically does not rain in
San Francisco in the summer”. To capture this, we need to allow Alice to consider several
plausibility measures possible; in some it typically does not rain and in others it typically
does. 1 As we shall see, this extra expressive power is necessary to capture some interesting
scenarios of belief change.
To deal with this, in addition to plausibility measures, we add a standard accessibility relation
to represent knowledge. Once we have knowledge in the picture, we define belief by saying
that an agent believes φ if she knows that φ is typically true. That is, according to all the
plausibility measures she considers possible, φ is more plausible than ¬φ.
The properties of belief depend on how the plausibility measure interacts with the acces-
sibility relation that defines knowledge. We study these interactions, keeping in mind that
plausibility generalizes probability. In view of this, it is perhaps not surprising that many
of the issues studied by Fagin and Halpern [FH94a] when considering the interaction of
knowledge and probability also arise in our framework. There are, however, a number of new
issues that arise in our framework due to the interaction between knowledge and belief. As
we shall see, if we take what are perhaps the most natural restrictions on this interaction, our
notion of belief is characterized by the axioms of the modal logic KD45 (where an agent has
complete introspective knowledge about her beliefs, but may have false beliefs). Moreover,
the interaction between knowledge and belief satisfies the standard properties considered
by Kraus and Lehmann [KL88]. Although our major goal is not an abstract study of the
properties of knowledge and belief, we view the fact that we have a concrete interpretation
under which these properties can be studied to be an important side-benefit of our approach.
Having a notion of belief is not enough in order to study belief change. We want a framework
that captures the beliefs of the agent before and after the change. This is achieved by
introducing time explicitly into the framework. The resulting framework is an extension of
the framework of Halpern and Fagin [HF89] for modeling knowledge in multi-agent systems,
and allows to talk about knowledge, plausibility (and hence belief), and time. This framework
is analogous to combination of knowledge, probability and time studied in [HT93]. As we
1 In fact, this issue is discussed by Boutilier [Bou92], although his framework does not allow him
to represent such a situation.
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show by example, having knowledge, plausibility, and time represented explicitly gives us a
powerful and expressive framework for capturing belief change.
This framework is particularly suited to studying how plausibility changes over time. One
important intuition we would like to capture is that of minimal change. Suppose an agent
gets new information at time t. Certainly we would expect his plausibility assessment (and
his beliefs) at time t+1 to incorporate this new information; otherwise, we would expect his
assessment at time t+ 1 to have changed minimally from his assessment at time t. In prob-
abilistic reasoning, it can be argued that conditioning captures this intuition. Conditioning
incorporates the new information by giving it probability 1. Moreover, the relative probability
of all events consistent with the new information is the same before and after conditioning,
so, in this sense, conditioning changes things minimally. We focus here on a plausibilistic
analogue of conditioning and argue that it captures the intuition of minimal change in plau-
sibilities. We can then proceed much in the spirit of the Bayesian approach, but starting with
a prior plausibility and conditioning. As we show, many situations previously studied in the
literature, such as diagnostic reasoning [Rei87], can be easily captured by using such prior
plausibilities. Moreover, as we show in a companion paper [FH97a], belief revision and belief
update—which both attempt to capture intuitions involving minimal change in beliefs—can
be captured in our framework by conditioning on an appropriate prior plausibility measure.
Thinking in terms of priors also gives us insight into other representations of belief change,
such as those of [Bou94b,GP92,LS94].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the syntax and
semantics of the standard approach to modeling knowledge using Kripke structures and show
how plausibility can be added to the framework. Much of our technical discussion of axiom-
atizations and decision procedures is closely related to that of [FH94a]. In Section 3.1, we
present our full framework which adds plausibility to the framework of [HF89] for modeling
knowledge (and time) in multi-agent systems. In Section 4 we introduce prior plausibilities
and show how they can be used. We conclude in Section 5 with some discussion of the general
approach. Proofs of theorems are given in Appendix A.
2 Knowledge and Plausibility
In this section, we briefly review the standard models for knowledge and beliefs (see [HM92]
for further motivation and details), describe a notion of plausibility, and then show how to
combine the two notions. Finally, we compare the derived notion of belief with previous work
on the subject.
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2.1 The Logic of Knowledge
We start by examining the standard models for knowledge and belief. The syntax for the logic
of knowledge is simple: we start with primitive propositions and close off under conjunction,
negation, and the modal operators K1, . . . , Kn. A formula such as Kiφ is read “agent i knows
φ”. The logic of belief is the result of replacing the Ki operator by Bi. The formula, Biφ is
read “agent i believes φ”. The resulting languages are denoted LK and LB, respectively.
The semantics for these languages is given by means of Kripke structures . A Kripke structure
for knowledge (or belief) is a tuple (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn), where W is a set of possible worlds,
π(w) is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions at world w ∈ W , and the Ki’s are
accessibility relations on the worlds inW . For convenience, we define Ki(w) = {w
′ : (w,w′) ∈
Ki}. Intuitively, Ki(w) describes the set of worlds that agent i considers possible in w. We
say that agent i knows (or believes) φ at world w, if all the worlds Ki(w) satisfy φ.
We assign truth values to formulas at each world in the structure. We write (M,w) |= φ if
the formula φ is true at a world w in the Kripke structure M .
• (M,w) |= p for a primitive proposition p if π(w)(p) = true,
• (M,w) |= ¬φ if (M,w) 6|= φ,
• (M,w) |= φ ∧ ψ if (M,w) |= φ and (M,w) |= ψ,
• (M,w) |= Kiφ if (M,w
′) |= φ for all w′ ∈ Ki(w).
The last clause captures the intuition that φ is known exactly when it is true in all possible
worlds. When considering the language of beliefs LB, we typically use Bi rather than Ki to
denote the accessibility relations. The truth condition for Biφ is exactly the same as for Kiφ.
Let MK be the class of Kripke structures described above. We say that φ ∈ L
K is valid
in some M ∈ MK if (M,w) |= φ for all w in M . We say that φ ∈ L
K is valid in MK if
it is valid in all models M ∈ MK . We say that φ is satisfiable in MK if there is a model
M ∈ MK and world w such that (M,w) |= φ.
The definition of Kripke structure does not put any restriction on the Ki relations. By
imposing conditions on the Ki relations we get additional properties of knowledge (or belief).
These properties are captured by systems of axioms that describe the valid formulas in classes
of structures that satisfy various constraints of interest. We briefly describe these systems and
the corresponding constraints on the accessibility relations. Consider the following axioms
and rules:
K1. All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
K2. Kiφ ∧Ki(φ⇒ ψ)⇒ Kiψ
K3. Kiφ⇒ φ
K4. Kiφ⇒ KiKiφ
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K5. ¬Kiφ⇒ Ki¬Kiφ
K6. ¬Kifalse
RK1. From φ and φ⇒ ψ infer ψ
RK2. From φ infer Kiφ
The system K contains the axioms K1 and K2 and the rules of inference RK1 and RK2. By
adding axioms K4 and K5 we get system K45; if in addition we add axiom K6 we get system
KD45; if instead we add axiom K3 to K45 we get the axiom system known as S5.
We now relate these axiom systems with restrictions on the accessibility relations. We start
with some definitions. A relation R on W is Euclidean if (x, y), (x, z) ∈ R implies that
(y, z) ∈ R, for all x, y and z in W ; it is reflexive if (x, x) ∈ R for all x ∈ W ; it is serial if for
all x ∈ W there is a y such that (x, y) ∈ R; and it is transitive if (x, y), (y, z) ∈ R implies that
(x, z) ∈ R, for x, y and z in W . LetMetK be the set of Kripke structures with Euclidean and
transitive accessibility relations,MestK be the subset ofM
et
K where the accessibility relations
are also serial, and MertK be the subset of M
et
K where the accessibility relations are also
transitive.
Theorem 1 [HM92] The axiom system K (resp. K45, KD45, S5) is a sound and complete
axiomatization of LK with respect to MK (resp. M
et
K, M
est
K , M
ert
K ).
In this paper, we use the multi-agent systems formalism of [FHMV95] to model knowledge;
this means that knowledge satisfies the axioms of S5. (We provide some motivation for this
choice below; see [FHMV95] for further discussion.)
This implies that if an agent knows φ, then φ is true (K3) and that the agent is introspective—
he knows what he knows and does not know (K4 and K5). Belief, on the other hand, is
typically viewed as defeasible. Thus, it does not necessarily satisfy K3. It may satisfy a weaker
property, such as K6, which says that the agent does not believe inconsistent formulas. Like
knowledge, belief is taken to be introspective, as it satisfies K4 and K5. Thus, in the literature,
belief has typically been take to satisfy K45 or KD45; we do the same here. According to
Theorem 1, this means that the notion of knowledge we use is characterized by MertK while
belief is characterized by MetK or M
est
K .
2
2.2 Plausibility Measures
Most non-probabilistic approaches to belief change require (explicitly or implicitly) that
the agent has some ordering over possible alternatives. For example, the agent might have a
preference ordering over possible worlds [Bou94b,Gro88,KM91b] or an entrenchment ordering
2 As is well known, a relation is reflexive, Euclidean and transitive if and only if it is an equivalence
relation (i.e., reflexive, symmetric and transitive). Thus, MertK consists of these structures where
the Ki’s are equivalence relations.
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over formulas [GM88]. This ordering dictates how the agent’s beliefs change. For example, in
[Gro88], the new beliefs are characterized by the most preferred worlds that are consistent
with the new observation, while in [GM88] beliefs are discarded according to their degree of
entrenchment until it is consistent to add the new observation to the resulting set of beliefs.
Keeping this insight in mind, we now describe plausibility measures [FH95,FH97b]. This is
a notion for handling uncertainty that generalizes previous approaches, including various
notions of preference ordering. We briefly review the relevant definitions and results here.
Recall that a probability space is a tuple (W,F ,Pr), where W is a set of worlds, F is
an algebra of measurable subsets of W (that is, a set of subsets closed under union and
complementation to which we assign probability), and Pr is a probability measure, that is, a
function mapping each set in F to a number in [0, 1] satisfying the well-known probability
axioms (Pr(∅) = 0, Pr(W ) = 1, and Pr(A ∪B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B), if A and B are disjoint).
A plausibility space is a direct generalization of a probability space. We simply replace the
probability measure Pr by a plausibility measure Pl, which, rather than mapping sets in F
to numbers in [0, 1], maps them to elements in some arbitrary partially ordered set. We read
Pl(A) as “the plausibility of set A”. If Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B), then B is at least as plausible as A.
Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W,F ,Pl), where W is a set of worlds, F is
an algebra of subsets of W , and Pl maps sets in F to some domain D of plausibility values
partially ordered by a relation ≤D (so that ≤D is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric).
We assume that D is pointed : that is, it contains two special elements ⊤D and ⊥D such that
⊥D≤D d ≤D ⊤D for all d ∈ D; we further assume that Pl(W ) = ⊤D and Pl(∅) =⊥D. As
usual, we define the ordering <D by taking d1 <D d2 if d1 ≤D d2 and d1 6= d2. We omit the
subscript D from ≤D, <D, ⊤D and ⊥D whenever it is clear from context.
Since we want a set to be at least as plausible as any of its subsets, we require
A1 If A ⊆ B, then Pl(A) ≤ Pl(B).
Some brief remarks on this definition: We have deliberately suppressed the domain D of
plausibility values from the tuple S, since for the purposes of this paper, only the ordering
induced by ≤ on the subsets in F is relevant. The algebra F also does not play a significant
role in this paper. Unless we say otherwise, we assume F contains all subsets of interest and
suppress mention of F , denoting a plausibility space as a pair (W,Pl).
Clearly plausibility spaces generalize probability spaces. We now briefly discuss a few other
notions of uncertainty that they generalize:
• A belief function B on W is a function B : 2W → [0, 1] satisfying certain axioms [Sha76].
These axioms certainly imply property A1, so a belief function is a plausibility measure.
• A fuzzy measure (or a Sugeno measure) f on W [WK92] is a function f : 2W 7→ [0, 1],
that satisfies A1 and some continuity constraints. A possibility measure [DP90] Poss is a
fuzzy measure such that Poss(W ) = 1, Poss(∅) = 0, and Poss(A) = supw∈A(Poss({w}).
• An ordinal ranking (or κ-ranking) on W (as defined by [GP92], based on ideas that go
7
back to [Spo88]) is a function κ : 2W → IN∗, where IN∗ = IN ∪ {∞}, such that κ(W ) = 0,
κ(∅) = ∞, and κ(A) = minw∈A(κ({w})). Intuitively, an ordinal ranking assigns a degree
of surprise to each subset of worlds in W , where 0 means unsurprising and higher numbers
denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that if κ is a ranking on W , then (W,κ) is a
plausibility space, where x ≤IN ∗ y if and only if y ≤ x under the usual ordering on the
ordinals.
• A preference ordering onW is a partial order≺ overW [KLM90,Sho87]. Intuitively, w ≺ w′
holds if w is preferred to w′. Preference orders have been used to provide semantics for
default (i.e., conditional) statements. In [FH97b] we show how to map preference orders
on W to plausibility measures on W in a way that preserves the ordering of events of the
form {w} as well as the truth values of defaults. We review these results below.
• A parametrized probability distribution (PPD) on W is a sequence {Pri : i ≥ 0} of
probability measures overW . Such structures provide semantics for defaults in ǫ-semantics
[Pea89,GMP93]. In [FH97b] we show how to map PPDs into plausibility structures in a
way that preserves the truth-values of conditionals (again, see discussion below).
2.3 The Logic of Conditionals
Our goal is to describe the agent’s beliefs in terms of plausibility. To do this, we describe
how to evaluate statements of the form Bφ given a plausibility space. In fact, we examine
a richer logical language that also allows us to describe how the agent compares different
alternatives. This is the logic of conditionals. Conditionals are statements of the form φ→ ψ,
read “given φ, ψ is plausible” or “given φ, then by default ψ”. The syntax of the logic of
conditionals is simple: we start with primitive propositions and close off under conjunction,
negation and the modal operator →. The resulting language is denoted LC .
Many semantics have been proposed in the literature for conditionals. Most of them involve
structures of the form (W,X, π), where W is a set of possible worlds, π(w) is a truth as-
signment to primitive propositions, and X is some “measure” on W such as a preference
ordering, a κ-ranking, or a possibility measure. We now describe some of the proposals in
the literature, and then show how they can be viewed as using plausibility measures. Given
a structure (W,X, π), let [[φ]] ⊆W be the set of worlds satisfying φ.
• A possibility structure is a tuple (W,Poss, π), where Poss is a possibility measure on W .
It satisfies a conditional φ→ ψ if either Poss([[φ]]) = 0 or Poss([[φ ∧ ψ]]) > Poss([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]])
[DP91]. That is, either φ is impossible, in which case the conditional holds vacuously, or
φ ∧ ψ is more possible than φ ∧ ¬ψ.
• A κ-structure is a tuple (W,κ, π), where κ is an ordinal ranking on W . It satisfies a
conditional φ→ ψ if either κ([[φ]]) =∞ or κ([[φ ∧ ψ]]) < κ([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]) [GP92].
• A preferential structure is a tuple (W,≺, π), where ≺ is a partial order onW . The intuition
[Sho87] is that a preferential structure satisfies a conditional φ→ ψ if all the most preferred
worlds (i.e., the minimal worlds according to ≺) in [[φ]] satisfy ψ. However, there may be
no minimal worlds in [[φ]]. This can happen if [[φ]] contains an infinite descending sequence
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. . . ≺ w2 ≺ w1. What do we do in these structures? There are a number of options: the first
is to assume that, for each formula φ, there are minimal worlds in [[φ]]; this is the assumption
actually made in [KLM90], where it is called the smoothness assumption. A yet more
general definition—one that works even if ≺ is not smooth—is given in [Lew73,Bou94a].
Roughly speaking, φ → ψ is true if, from a certain point on, whenever φ is true, so is ψ.
More formally,
(W,≺, π) satisfies φ→ ψ, if for every world w1 ∈ [[φ]], there is a world w2 such that (a)
w2  w1 (so that w2 is at least as normal as w1), (b) w2 ∈ [[φ∧ψ]], and (c) for all worlds
w3 ≺ w2, we have w3 ∈ [[φ ⇒ ψ]] (so any world more normal than w2 that satisfies φ
also satisfies ψ).
It is easy to verify that this definition is equivalent to the earlier one if ≺ is smooth.
• A PPD structure is a tuple (W, {Pri : i ≥ 0}, π), where {Pri} is PPD over W . Intuitively,
it satisfies a conditional φ → ψ if the conditional probability ψ given φ goes to 1 in the
limit. Formally, φ→ ψ is satisfied if limi→∞ Pri([[ψ]]|[[ψ]]) = 1 [GMP93] (where Pri([[ψ]]|[[φ]])
is taken to be 1 if Pri([[φ]]) = 0).
In [FH97b] we use plausibility to provide semantics for conditionals and show that our
definition generalizes the definition in the various approaches we just described. We briefly
review the definitions and results here.
A plausibility structure is a tuple PL = (W,Pl, π), where Pl is a plausibility measure on W .
Conditionals are evaluated according to a rule that is essentially that used in possibility
structures:
• PL |= φ→ ψ if either Pl([[φ]]) =⊥ or Pl([[φ ∧ ψ]]) > Pl([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]]).
Intuitively, φ → ψ holds vacuously if φ is impossible; otherwise, it holds if φ ∧ ψ is more
plausible than φ ∧ ¬ψ. It is easy to see that this semantics for conditionals generalizes
the semantics of conditionals in possibility structures and κ-structures. The following result
shows that it also generalizes the semantics of conditionals in preferential structures and
PPD structures.
Proposition 2 [FH97b]
(a) If ≺ is a preference ordering on W , then there is a plausibility measure Pl≺ on W such
that (W,≺, π) |= φ→ ψ if and only if (W,Pl≺, π) |= φ→ ψ.
(b) If PP = {Pri} is a PPD on W , then there is a plausibility measure PlPP such that
(W, {Pri}, π) |= φ→ ψ if and only if (W,PlPP , π) |= φ→ ψ.
We briefly describe the construction of Pl≺ and PlPP here, since we use them in the sequel.
Given a preference order ≺ on W , let D0 be the domain of plausibility values consisting of
one element dw for every element w ∈ W . We define a partial order on D0 using ≺: dv < dw
if w ≺ v. (Recall that w ≺ w′ denotes that w is preferred to w′.) We then take D to be
the smallest set containing D0 that is closed under least upper bounds (so that every set of
elements in D has a least upper bound in D). For a subset A ofW , we can then define Pl≺(A)
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to be the least upper bound of {dw : w ∈ A}. Since D is closed under least upper bounds,
Pl≺(A) is well defined. As shown in [FH97b], this choice of Pl≺ satisfies Proposition 2.
The construction in the case of PPD’s is even more straightforward. Given a PPD PP =
{Pri} on W , we define PlPP as follows:
PlPP (A) ≤ PlPP (B) if and only if limi→∞ Pri(B|A ∪B) = 1.
A straightforward argument shows that this choice of PlPP satisfies Proposition 2.
These results show that our semantics for conditionals in plausibility structures generalizes
the various approaches examined in the literature. Does it capture our intuitions about
conditionals? In the AI literature, there has been discussion of the right properties of default
statements (which are essentially conditionals). While there has been little consensus on
what the “right” properties for defaults should be, there has been some consensus on a
reasonable “core” of inference rules for default reasoning. This core, known as the KLM
properties [KLM90], consists of the following axiom and rules of inference:
LLE. From φ⇔ φ′ and φ→ ψ infer φ′ → ψ (left logical equivalence)
RW. From ψ ⇒ ψ′ and φ→ ψ infer φ→ ψ′ (right weakening)
REF. φ→ φ (reflexivity)
AND. From φ→ ψ1 and φ→ ψ2 infer φ→ ψ1 ∧ ψ2
OR. From φ1 → ψ and φ2 → ψ infer φ1 ∨ φ2 → ψ
CM. From φ→ ψ1 and φ→ ψ2 infer φ ∧ ψ1 → ψ2 (cautious monotonicity)
LLE states that the syntactic form of the antecedent is irrelevant. Thus, if φ1 and φ2 are
equivalent, we can deduce φ2 → ψ from φ1 → ψ. RW describes a similar property of the
consequent: If ψ (logically) entails ψ′, then we can deduce φ→ ψ′ from φ→ ψ. This allows us
to can combine default and logical reasoning. REF states that φ is always a default conclusion
of φ. AND states that we can combine two default conclusions: If we can conclude by default
both ψ1 and ψ2 from φ, we can also conclude ψ1 ∧ψ2 from φ. OR states that we are allowed
to reason by cases: If the same default conclusion follows from each of two antecedents, then
it also follows from their disjunction. CM states that if ψ1 and ψ2 are two default conclusions
of φ, then discovering that ψ1 holds when φ holds (as would be expected, given the default)
should not cause us to retract the default conclusion ψ2.
Do conditionals in plausibility structures satisfy the KLM properties? In general, the answer
is no. It is almost immediate from the definition that a probability measure Pr is also a
plausibility measure. Notice that Pr([[φ∧ψ]]) > Pr([[φ∧¬ψ]]) if and only if Pr([[ψ]] | [[φ]]) > 1/2.
Expanding the semantics of conditionals, we get that φ→ ψ holds in Pr exactly if Pr([[φ]]) = 0
or Pr([[ψ]] | [[φ]]) > 1/2. It is easy to see that this definition does not satisfy the AND rule:
it is not in general the case that φ → ψ1 and φ → ψ2 together imply φ → (ψ1 ∧ ψ2), since
Pr(A1 | B) > 1/2 and Pr(A2 | B) > 1/2 do not imply Pr(A1 ∩A2|B) > 1/2. Since the AND
rule is a fundamental feature of qualitative reasoning, we would like to restrict to plausibility
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structures where it holds. In [FH97b] we show that the following condition is necessary and
sufficient to guarantee that the And rule holds:
A2 If A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets, Pl(A∪B) > Pl(C), and Pl(A∪C) > Pl(B),
then Pl(A) > Pl(B ∪ C).
It turns out that conditionals in plausibility structures that satisfy A2 also satisfy LLE,
RW, and CM. They also satisfy OR when one of the conditionals φ1 → ψ and φ2 → ψ is
satisfied non-vacuously (that is, in a plausibility measure Pl such that either Pl([[φ1]]) > ⊥
or Pl([[φ2]]) > ⊥). To satisfy OR in general we need another condition:
A3 If Pl(A) = Pl(B) =⊥, then Pl(A ∪ B) =⊥.
A3 also has a nice axiomatic characterization. Let Nφ be an abbreviation for ¬φ → false.
(This operator is called the “outer modality” in [Lew73].) Expanding the definition of →,
we get that Nφ holds at w if and only if Pl([[¬φ]]) =⊥. Thus, Nφ holds if ¬φ is considered
completely implausible. We can think of the N modality as the plausibilistic version of
necessity. It is easy to show that A3 corresponds to an AND rule for N . It holds exactly if
(Nφ ∧Nψ)⇒ N(φ ∧ ψ).
A plausibility space (W,Pl) is qualitative if it satisfies A2 and A3. A plausibility structure
(W,Pl, π) is qualitative if (W,Pl) is a qualitative plausibility space. In [FH97b] we show that,
in a very general sense, qualitative plausibility structures capture default reasoning. More
precisely, we show that the KLM properties are sound with respect to a class of plausibility
structures if and only if the class consists of qualitative plausibility structures. We also show
that a very weak condition is necessary and sufficient in order for the KLM properties to be
complete axiomatization of the language of default entailment considered in [KLM90]. These
results help explain why so many different approaches to giving semantics to conditionals
are characterized by the KLM properties. In addition, as we shall see, it also shows that if
we want belief to have some reasonable properties, then we need to restrict to qualitative
plausibility measures.
2.4 Combining Knowledge and Plausibility
We now define a logic that combines knowledge and plausibility. Let LKC be the language
obtained by starting with primitive propositions, and closing off under conjunction, negation,
and the operatorsKi and→i , i = 1, . . . , n. Note that we have a different conditional operator
for each agent. We read φ→i ψ as “according to agent i’s plausibility measure, φ typically
implies ψ”.
A (Kripke) structure (for knowledge and plausibility) is a tuple (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn,P1, . . . ,Pn)
where W , π and Ki are just as in Kripke structures for knowledge, while Pi is a plausibility
assignment, a function that assigns a plausibility space to agent i at each world. Intuitively,
the structure Pi(w) = (W(w,i),Pl(w,i)) captures agent i’s plausibility measure in the world w.
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For now we allowW(w,i) to be an arbitrary subset ofW . We discuss some possible restrictions
on W(w,i) below. It is reasonable to ask at this point where the plausibility spaces Pi(w) are
coming from, and why we need a different one for each agent at each world. The answer to
this question depends very much on the intended application. We defer further discussion of
this issue until later.
We can now give semantics to formulas in LKC in Kripke structures for knowledge and
plausibility. This is done in a recursive way using the rules specified above for LK and LC .
Statements of the form Kiφ are evaluated according to Ki:
• (M,w) |= Kiφ if (M,w
′) |= φ for all w′ ∈ Ki(w).
Statements of the form φ →i ψ are evaluated according to Pi. Let [[φ]](w,i) = {w
′ ∈ W(w,i) :
(M,w′) |= φ}.
• (M,w) |= φ→i ψ if either Pl(w,i)([[φ]](w,i)) =⊥ or Pl(w,i)([[φ∧ψ]](w,i)) > Pl(w,i)([[φ∧¬ψ]](w,i)).
We now define beliefs. Recall that true →i φ means that φ is more plausible than ¬φ
according to agent’s i plausibility measure. We might say that in this case the agent believes
φ. However, recall that the agent can have different plausibility assessments at different
worlds. Thus, there can be a modelM , and worlds w,w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Ki, but (M,w) |=
true→i φ while (M,w
′) |= ¬(true→i φ). (In Example 5, we show why this extra expressive
power is necessary.) That is, φ is more plausible than ¬φ in one of the worlds the agent
considers possible, but not in another. Since our intention is that the agent should not
distinguish between accessible worlds, we would like the agent to have the same beliefs in all
the worlds he considers possible. We say that an agent believes φ if he knows that φ is more
plausible than ¬φ in all the worlds he considers possible. Thus, we define Biφ, read “agent
i believes φ”, as an abbreviation for Ki(true→i φ).
2.5 Example: Circuit Diagnosis
The following example illustrates some of the expressive power of this language. Although
it only involves one agent and only one plausibility measure in any given structure, it can
easily be extended to allow for many agents with different plausibility measures.
The circuit diagnosis problem has been well studied in the literature (see [DH88] for an
overview). Consider a circuit that contains n logical components c1, . . . , cn and k lines
l1, . . . , lk. As a concrete example, consider the circuit of Figure 1.
3 The diagnosis task is
to identify which components are faulty. The agent can set the values of input lines of the
circuit and observe the output values. The agent then compares the actual output values to
the expected output values and attempts to locate faulty components.
3 The “full adder” example is often used in the diagnosis literature. In our discussion here we
loosely follow the examples of Reiter [Rei87].
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Fig. 1. A full adder. X1 and X2 are XOR gates, A1 and A2 are AND gates, and O1 is an OR gate.
We model this situation using the tools we presented in the previous sections. We start by
describing the agent’s knowledge using a Kripke structure. We then construct two possi-
ble plausibility measures over worlds in this Kripke structures, and examine the resulting
knowledge and belief.
Knowledge We model the agent’s knowledge about the circuit using the Kripke struc-
ture MKdiag = (Wdiag, πdiag,Kdiag). Each possible world w ∈ Wdiag is composed of two parts:
fault(w), the failure set—that is, the set of faulty components in w, and value(w), the value
of all the lines in the circuit. We consider only worlds where the components that are not in
the failure sets perform as expected. For example, in the circuit of Figure 1, if the AND gate
A1 is not faulty, then we require that l5 has value “high” if and only if both l1 and l2 have
the value “high”. Most accounts of diagnosis assume that there is a logical theory ∆ that
describes the properties of the device. To capture our intuition, it must be the case that w
is a possible world in M if and only if fault(w) and value(w) are together consistent with ∆.
The most straightforward language for reasoning about faults is the following: let Φdiag =
{faulty(c1), . . . , faulty(cn), hi(l1), . . . , hi(lk)} be the set of propositions, where each faulty(ci)
denotes that component i is faulty and hi(li) denotes that line i in a “high” state. We then
define the interpretation πdiag in the obvious way: πdiag(w)(faulty(ci)) = true if ci ∈ fault(w),
and πdiag(w)(hi(li)) = true if 〈li, 1〉 ∈ value(w).
Next, we need to define the agent’s knowledge. We define ow ⊆ value(w) to be the values of
those lines the agent sets or observes. The agent knows which tests he has performed and
the results he observed. Therefore, we have (w,w′) ∈ Kdiag if ow = ow′. For example, suppose
the agent observes hi(l1)∧hi(l2)∧hi(l3)∧hi(l7)∧hi(l8). The agent then considers possible all
worlds where the same observations hold. Since these observations are consistent with the
correct behavior of the circuit, one of these worlds has an empty failure set. However, other
worlds are possible. For example, it might be that the AND gate A2 is faulty. This would
not affect the outputs in this case, since if A1 is non-faulty, then its output is “high”, and
thus, O1’s output is “high” regardless of A2’s output.
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Now suppose that the agent observes hi(l1)∧¬hi(l2)∧hi(l3)∧hi(l7)∧¬hi(l8). These observa-
tions imply that the circuit is faulty. (If l1 and l3 are “high” and l2 is “low”, then the correct
values for l7 and l8 should be “low” and “high”, respectively.) In this case there are several
possible failure sets, including {X1}, {X2, O1}, and {X2, A2}.
In general, there is more than one explanation for the observed faulty behavior. Thus, the
agent can not know exactly which components are faulty, but he may have beliefs on that
score.
Plausibility To model the agent’s beliefs, we need to decide on the plausibility measure
the agent has at any world. We assume that only failure sets are relevant for determining
a world’s plausibility. Thus, we start by constructing a plausibility measure over possible
failures of the circuit. We assume that failures of individual components are independent of
one another. If we also assume that the likelihood of each component failing is the same, we
can construct a preference ordering on failure set as follows: If f1 and f2 are two failure sets,
we say that f1 is preferred to f2 if |f1| < |f2|, that is, if f1 consists of fewer faulty components
than f2. This preference ordering induces a plausibility measure using the construction of
Proposition 2. In this measure Pl(F1) < Pl(F2) if minf∈F1(|f |) < minf∈F2(|f |).
We can construct the same plausibility measure based on probabilistic arguments using
PPDs. Suppose that the probability of a single component failing is ǫ. Since we have assumed
that failures are independent, it follows that the probability of a failure set f is ǫ|f |(1−ǫ)(n−|f |),
since there are |f | components that fail, and n−|f | components that do not fail. To model the
behavior of small but unknown failure probability, we can consider the PPD (Pr0,Pr1, . . .),
where in Prm the probability of a single failure is 1/(m + 1). It is not hard to check that
limm→∞ Prm(F2)/Prm(F1) = 0 if and only if Pl(F2) < Pl(F1) in the plausibility measure
described above. Interestingly, this plausibility measure is almost identical to the κ-ranking
in which κ({f}) = |f |. The only difference is that if |f1| = |f2|, Pl({f1}) is incomparable to
Pl({f2}) in the plausibility measure we constructed, while they are equal according to the
κ-ranking.
In some situations it might be unreasonable to assume that all components have equal failure
probability. Thus, we might assume that for each component ci there is a probability ǫi of
failure. If we assume independence, then given ~ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫn), the probability of a failure
set f is Πci∈fǫiΠci 6∈f (1 − ǫi). We can construct a PPD that captures the effect of the ǫi’s
getting smaller, but at possibly different rates: Suppose g is a bijection from INm to IN .
If ~m = (m1, . . . , mn), let Prg(~m) be the distribution where the probability of ci failing is
1/(mi + 1), for i = 1, . . . , n. In this case, we get that limm→∞ Prm(f2)/Prm(f1) = 0 if and
only if f2 is a strict subset of f1, i.e., if f1 contains all the components in f2 and more. Since
we do not assume any relations among the failure probabilities of different components, it
is not possible to compare failure sets unless one is a subset of the other. Thus, we can
define f ≺ f ′ if f ⊂ f ′. Using the construction of Proposition 2, we can again consider the
plausibility measure Pl induced by ≺. It is not hard to see that Pl(F1) ≤ Pl(F2) if for every
failure set f1 ∈ F1 − F2 there is some f2 ∈ F2 such that f2 ≺ f1. As our construction shows,
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this plausibility measure can be induced by either a preference ordering or a PPD; however,
it cannot be captured by a κ-ranking or a possibility measure, since the ordering on failure
sets is partial.
Beliefs We now have the required components to examine the agent’s beliefs. Using the
two plausibility measures we just described, we can construct two possible structures Mdiag,1
and Mdiag,2. In both structures we set W(w,1) = Kdiag(w), and in both Mdiag,1 and Mdiag,2 the
plausibility measure is induced from a preference ordering on failures (using the construction
of Proposition 2). In Mdiag,1, we take the plausibility measure to be such that Pl(w,1)({w}) ≥
Pl(w,1)({w
′}) if and only if |fault(w)| ≤ |fault(w′)|, and in Mdiag,2 so that Pl(w,1)({w}) ≥
Pl(w,1)({w
′}) if and only if fault(w) ⊆ fault(w′). It is easy to see that, in both structures,
if there is a world w in which these observations occur and where fault(w) = ∅, then the
agent believes that the circuit is faultless. If the agent detects an error, he believes that
it is caused by one of the minimal explanations of his observations, where the notion of
minimality differs in the two structures. We now make this statement more precise. Let
f be a failure set. Let Df be the formula that denotes that f is the failure set, so that
(M,w) |= Df if and only if fault(w) = f . The agent believes that f is a possible diagnosis
(i.e., an explanation of his observations) if ¬B1¬Df . The set of diagnoses the agent considers
possible is Bel(M,w) = {f : (M,w) |= ¬B1¬Df}. We say that a failure set f is consistent
with an observation o if it is possible to observe o when f occurs, i.e., if there is a world w
in W such that fault(w) = f and ow = o.
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Proposition 3 (a) Bel(Mdiag,1, w) contains all failure sets f that are consistent with ow
such that there is no failure set f ′ with |f ′| < |f | which is consistent with ow.
(b) Bel(Mdiag,2, w) contains all failure sets f that are consistent with ow such that there is
no failure set f ′ with f ′ ⊂ f which is consistent with ow.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
Thus, both Bel(Mdiag,1, w) and Bel(Mdiag,2, w) consist of minimal sets of failure sets consistent
with ow, for different notions of minimality. In the case of Mdiag,1, “minimality” means
“of minimal cardinality”, while in the case of Mdiag,2, it means “minimal in terms of set
containment”. This proposition shows thatMdiag,1 andMdiag,2 capture standard assumptions
made in model-based diagnosis; Mdiag,1 captures the assumptions made in [de 90], while
Mdiag,2 captures the assumptions made in [Rei87]. More concretely, in our example, if the
agent observes hi(l1)∧¬hi(l2)∧hi(l3)∧hi(l7)∧¬hi(l8), then inMdiag,1 she would believe that
X1 is faulty, since {X1} is the only diagnosis with cardinality one. On the other hand, in
Mdiag,2 she would believe that one of the three minimal diagnoses occurred: {X1}, {X2, O1}
or {X2, A2}.
4 Note that if ∆ is a theory that describes the properties of circuit, then a failure f is consistent
with observation o, if and only if f and o are consistent according to ∆.
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2.6 Properties of Knowledge and Plausibility
Kripke structures for knowledge and plausibility are quite similar to the Kripke structures for
knowledge and probability introduced by Fagin and Halpern [FH94a]. The only difference
is that in Kripke structures for knowledge and probability, Pi(w) is a probability space
rather than a plausibility space. Fagin and Halpern explore various natural restrictions on
the interactions between the probability spaces Pi(w) and the accessibility relations Ki.
Here we investigate restrictions on the interaction between the plausibility spaces and the
accessibility relations. Not surprisingly, some of these conditions are exact analogues to
conditions investigated by Fagin and Halpern.
Given our interest in the KLM properties, we will be interested in structures that satisfy the
following condition:
QUAL Pi(w) is qualitative for all worlds w and agents i.
The same arguments that show that A2 gives us the AND rule also show that it gives us
property K2 for beliefs. More precisely, we have the following result.
Theorem 4 If M satisfies QUAL, then for all worlds w in M , we have
(a) (M,w) |= ((σ →i φ) ∧ (σ →i ψ))⇒ (σ →i (φ ∧ ψ))
(b) (M,w) |= Biφ ∧Biψ ⇒ Bi(φ ∧ ψ)
(c) (M,w) |= Biφ ∧Bi(φ ∧ ψ)⇒ Biψ.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
In view of this result, we typically assume that QUAL holds whenever we want to reason
about belief.
The set W(w,i) consists of all worlds to which agent i assigns some degree of plausibility in
world w. We would not expect the agent to place a positive probability on worlds that he
considers impossible. Similarly, he would not want to consider as plausible (even remotely)
a world he knows to be impossible. This intuition leads us to the following condition, called
CONS for consistency (following [FH94a]):
CONS W(w,i) ⊆ Ki(w) for all worlds w and all agents i.
5
5 We remark that CONS is inappropriate if we use→ to model, not plausibility, but counterfactual
conditions, as is done by Lewis [Lew73]. If CONS holds, then it is easy to see that Kiφ⇒ Ki(¬φ→i
ψ) is valid, for all ψ. That is, if agent i knows φ, then he knows that in the most plausible worlds
where ¬φ is true, ψ is vacuously true, because there are no plausible worlds where ¬φ is true. On
the other hand, under the counterfactual reading, it makes perfect sense to say “I know the match
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A consequence of assuming CONS is a stronger connection between knowledge and belief.
Since CONS implies that the most plausible worlds are in Ki(w), it follows that if the agent
knows φ he also believes φ. (Indeed, as we shall see, this condition characterizes CONS.)
In probability theory, the agent assigns probability 1 to the set of all worlds. Since 1 > 0, this
means the agent assigns non-zero probability to some sets of worlds. It is possible to have
⊤ = ⊥ in plausibility spaces. If this happens, the agent considers all sets to be completely
implausible. The following condition, called NORM for normality (following [Lew73]), says
this does not happen:
NORM P(w, i) is normal, that is, ⊤(w,i) >⊥(w,i), for all worlds w and all agents i.
We can strengthen this condition somewhat to one that says that the agent never considers
the real world implausible. This suggests the following condition: Pl(w,i)({w}) >⊥. Stating
this condition, however, leads to a technical problem. Recall that Pl(w,i) is defined over the
set of measurable subsets of W(w,i). In general, however, singletons may not be measurable.
Thus, we examine a slightly weaker condition which we call REF for reflexive (following
[Lew73]):
REF For all worlds w and all agents i,
• w ∈ W(w,i), and
• Pl(w,i)(A) >⊥ for all A ∈ F(w,i) such that w ∈ A.
As we said in the introduction, much of the previous work using conditionals assumed (im-
plicitly or explicitly) that the agent considers only one plausibility measure possible. This
amounts to assuming that the plausibility measure is a function of the agent’s epistemic
state. This is captured by an assumption called SDP (following [FH94a]) for state deter-
mined plausibilities :
SDP For all worlds w and w′ and all agents i, if (w,w′) ∈ Ki then Pi(w) = Pi(w
′).
It is easy to see that SDP implies that an agent knows his plausibility measure. In particular,
as we shall see, with SDP we have that φ→i ψ implies Ki(φ→i ψ).
It is easy to verify that the structures described in the diagnosis example of Section 2.5
satisfy CONS, REF, and SDP. As mentioned in the introduction, SDP is not appropriate in
all situations; at times we may want to allow the agent to consider possible several plausibility
measures. To capture this, we need to generalize SDP. The following example might help
motivate the formal definition.
Example 5 This is a variation of the Liar’s Paradox. On a small Pacific island there are
two tribes, the Rightfeet and the Leftfeet. The Rightfeet are known to usually tell the truth,
while the Leftfeet are known to usually lie. Alice is a visitor to the island. She encounters a
native, Bob, and discusses with him various aspects of life on the island. Now, Alice does not
is dry, but it is not the case that if it were wet, then it would light if it were struck.”
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know to what tribe Bob belongs. Thus, she considers it possible both that Bob is a Rightfoot
and that he is a Leftfoot. In the first case, she should believe what he tells her and in the
second she should be skeptical.
One possible way of capturing this situation is by partitioning the worlds Alice considers
possible into two sets, according to Bob’s tribe. Let WR (resp. WL) be the set of worlds
that Alice considers possible where Bob is a Rightfoot (resp. Leftfoot). As the discussion
above suggests, Alice’s plausibility measure at the worlds of WR gives greater plausibility
to worlds where Bob is telling the truth than to worlds where Bob is lying; the opposite
situation holds at worlds of WL. In such a structure, the formula ¬KAlice¬(tell(φ) →Alice
¬φ) ∧ ¬KAlice¬(tell(φ)→Alice φ) is satisfiable, where tell(φ) is the formula that holds when
Bob tells Alice φ. On the other hand, in structures satisfying SDP, this formula is satisfiable
only when tell(φ) has plausibility ⊥ in all the worlds that Alice considers possible.
While this example may seem contrived, in many situations it is possible to extract param-
eters such as Leftfoot and Rightfoot that determine which conditional statements are true.
For example, when we introduce time into the picture (in Section 3.1), these parameters
might be the agent’s own actions in the future. Such a partition allows us to make state-
ments such as “I do not know whether φ is plausible or not, but I know that if I do a, then
φ is plausible”, where φ is some statement about the future. If the agent does not know the
value of these parameters, she will not necessarily know which conditionals are true at a
given world (as was the case in the example above).
Example 5 motivates the condition called uniformity.
UNIF For all worlds w and agents i, if w′ ∈ W(w,i) then Pi(w) = Pi(w
′). 6
It is not hard to show that UNIF holds if and only if, for each agent i, we can partition
the set of possible worlds in such a way that for each cell C in the partition, there is a
plausibility space (WC ,PlC) such thatWC ⊆ C and Pi(w) = (WC ,PlC) for all worlds w ∈ C.
Moreover, if CONS also holds, then this partition refines the partition induced by the agent’s
knowledge, i.e., if C is a cell in the partition and w is some world C, then C ⊆ Ki(w). It
easily follows that SDP and CONS together imply UNIF.
When we model uncertainty about the relative plausibility of different worlds this way it
is reasonable to demand that the plausibility measure totally orders all events; i.e., it is a
ranking. The RANK assumption is:
RANK For all worlds w and agents i, Pi(w) is a ranking, that is, for all sets A,B ⊆Ww
either Plw(A) ≤ Plw(B) or Plw(B) ≤ Plw(A), and Plw(A ∪ B) = max(Plw(A),Plw(B)).
Note that κ-rankings and possibility measures are two examples of rankings. Additionally,
rational preference orderings of [KLM90] are essentially rankings in the sense that for each
6 This condition is not the same as uniformity as defined in [Lew73]; rather, it corresponds in the
Lewis terminology to absoluteness.
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rational preference ordering we can construct a ranking that satisfies exactly the same con-
ditional statements [Fri97,FH97b].
While rankings are quite natural, they have often been rejected as being too inexpressive
[Gin86]. In a ranking there is a total order on events. The standard argument for partial orders
is as follows: In general, an agent may not be able to determine the relative plausibility of a
and b. If the plausibility measure is a ranking, the agent is forced to make this determination;
with a partial order, he is not. This argument loses much of its force in our framework, once
we combine knowledge and plausibility. As we said above, the agent’s ignorance can be
modeled by allowing him to consider (at least) two rankings possible, one in which a is more
plausible than b, and one in which b is more plausible that a. The agent then believes neither
that a is more plausible than b nor that b is more plausible than a.
2.7 Knowledge and Belief
How reasonable is the notion of belief we have defined? In this section, we compare it to
other notions considered in the literature.
Recall that LB be the language where the only modal operators are B1, . . . , Bn. Let L
KB be
the language where we have K1, . . . , Kn and B1, . . . , Bn (but no→i operators). It is not hard
to see (and will follow from our proofs below) that to get belief to satisfy even minimal such
as K2, we need the AND rule to hold. Thus, in this section, we restrict attention to Kripke
structures for knowledge and plausibility that satisfy QUAL. We then want to investigate
the impact of adding additional assumptions. Let M be the set of all Kripke structures for
knowledge and plausibility that satisfy QUAL, and let MCONS (resp. MCONS,NORM) be the
structures satisfying QUAL and CONS (resp. QUAL, CONS and NORM).
Work on belief and knowledge in the literature [HM92,Hin62,Lev84] has focused on the modal
systems S5, KD45, K45, and K with semantics based on Kripke structures as described
in Section 2.1. Before we examine the properties of belief in our approach, we relate our
semantics of belief (in terms of plausibility) to the more standard Kripke approach, which
presumes that belief is defined in terms of a binary relation Bi. Can we define a relation Bi
in terms of Ki and Pi such that (M,w) |= Biφ if and only if (M, v) |= φ for all v ∈ Bi(w)?
We show that this is possible in some structures, but not in general.
Let S = (W,Pl) be a qualitative plausibility space. We say that A ⊆ W is a set of most
plausible worlds if Pl(A) > Pl(A) (where A is the complement of A, i.e., W − A) and for
all B ⊂ A, Pl(B) 6> Pl(B). That is, A is a minimal set of worlds that is more plausible
than its complement. It is easy to verify that if such a set exists, then it must be unique.
To see this, suppose that A and A′ are both sets of most plausible worlds. We now show
that Pl(A ∩ A′) > Pl(A ∩ A′). Since A and A′ are both most plausible sets of worlds, this
will show that we must have A = A′. To see that Pl(A ∩ A′) > Pl(A ∩ A′), first note
that A ∩ A′, A − A′ and A are pairwise disjoint. Since A and A′ are most plausible sets
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of worlds, we have that Pl((A ∩ A′) ∪ (A − A′)) = Pl(A) > Pl(A) and Pl((A ∩ A′) ∪ A) ≥
Pl((A ∩ A′) ∪ (A′ − A)) = Pl(A′) > Pl(A′) ≥ Pl(A − A′). We can apply A2 to get that
Pl(A ∩A′) > Pl((A− A′) ∪A) = Pl(A ∩ A′).
In finite plausibility structures (that is, ones with only finitely many worlds), it is easy to see
that there is always a (unique) set of most plausible worlds. In general, however, a set of most
plausible worlds does not necessarily exist. For example, consider the space S0 = (W,Pl),
where W = {wi : i ≥ 0} and Pl is defined as follows: Pl(A) = ∞ if A contains an infinite
number of worlds, and Pl(A) = maxwi∈A(i) otherwise. Suppose that Pl(A) > Pl(A). A must
be finite, for otherwise Pl(A) = ∞. Thus, A must be infinite. Suppose wi ∈ A. It is easy
to see that A− {wi} is infinite and A− {wi} is finite. Thus, Pl(A− {wi}) > Pl(A− {wi}).
This shows that there does not exist a set of most plausible worlds in S.
If there is no set of most plausible worlds, then we may not be able to find a relation Bi
that characterizes agent i’s beliefs. For example, consider the structure M = (W,π,K1,P1),
where W = {wi : i ≥ 0} is the set of worlds described in S0 above; π assigns truth values
to primitive propositions p1, p2, . . . in such a way that π(wi)(pj) = true if and only if j ≥ i;
K1 is the complete accessibility relation K1 = W ×W ; and P1(wi) is the space S0 described
above. It is not hard to verify that (M,w0) |= B1φ if and only if [[¬φ]](w0,i) is a finite set,
i.e., there is an index i such that for all j ≥ i, we have (M,wj) |= φ. Thus, (M,w0) |= B1pj
for all j ≥ 0. Yet there are no worlds in the model that satisfy all the propositions pj at
once. Thus, there is no accessibility relation B1 that characterizes agent 1’s beliefs in w0.
On the other hand, we can show that if there is always a set of most plausible worlds, then
we can characterize the agents’ beliefs by an accessibility relation. Let S = (W,Pl) be a
plausibility space. Define MP(S) to be the set of most plausible worlds in S if it exists, and
∅ if Pl(W ) =⊥. Otherwise MP(S) is not defined.
Proposition 6 Let M be a Kripke structure for knowledge and plausibility. If MP(Pi(w
′))
is defined for all w′ ∈ Ki(w), then (M,w) |= Biφ if and only if (M,w
′′) |= φ for all w′′ ∈
∪w′∈Ki(w)MP(Pi(w
′)).
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
This proposition implies that, if most plausible sets of worlds always exist inM , then we can
set Bi(w) = ∪w′∈Ki(w)MP(Pi(w
′)) and recover the usual Kripke-style semantics for belief.
This discussion shows that our model of belief is more general than the classical Kripke-
structure account of beliefs, since there are models where the agent’s beliefs are not de-
termined by a set of accessible worlds. However, as we shall see, this does not lead to new
properties of beliefs in LB. Roughly speaking, this is because we have a finite model property:
a formula in LB is satisfiable if and only if it is satisfiable in a finite model (see Theorem 13
below). It is easy to verify that in a finite model MP(Pi(w)) is always defined. We note,
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however, that this finite model property is no longer true when we consider the interaction
of beliefs with other modalities, such as time, or when we examine the first-order case. In
these situations, the two models of beliefs are not equivalent. Plausibility is strictly more
expressive; see [FHK96].
We now examine the formal properties of belief and knowledge in structures of knowledge
and plausibility. We start by restricting our attention to LB. As we show below, the modal
system K precisely characterizes the valid formulas of LB in the class M. However, in the
literature, belief has typically been taken to be characterized by the modal system K45 or
KD45, not K. We get K45 by restricting to models that satisfy CONS, and KD45 by further
restricting to models that satisfy NORM. Thus, the two requirements that are most natural,
at least if we have a probabilistic intuition for plausibility, are already enough to make Bi a
KD45 operator.
Theorem 7 K (resp., K45, KD45) is a sound and complete axiomatization for LB with
respect to M (resp., MCONS, MCONS,NORM).
PROOF. See Appendix A.1. ✷
We now consider knowledge and belief together. This combination has been investigated in
the literature [KL88,Voo92]. In particular, Kraus and Lehmann [KL88] define Kripke struc-
tures for knowledge and belief that have two accessibility relations, one characterizing the
worlds that are knowledge-accessible and one characterizing worlds that are belief-accessible.
Ki and Bi are defined, as usual, in terms of these relations. They argue that the two acces-
sibility relations must be coherent in the sense that the agent knows what she believes and
believes what she knows to be true. Kraus and Lehmann describe restrictions on the inter-
action between the two relations that force this coherence. They show that in the resulting
structures, the interactions between knowledge and belief are characterized by the following
axioms.
KB1. Biφ⇒ KiBiφ
KB2. Kiφ⇒ Biφ
It turns out that KB1 holds in M and KB2 is a consequence of CONS. To see this, recall
that Biφ ≡ Ki(true→ φ). Using positive introspection for knowledge (axiom K4), we derive
that Biφ⇒ KiKi(true→ φ). This is equivalent to axiom KB1. When M satisfies CONS, we
have that W(w,i) ⊆ Ki(w). If (M,w) |= Kiφ, then all worlds in Ki(w) satisfy φ. This implies
that there are no worlds satisfying ¬φ in W(w,i), and thus Biφ must hold. Thus, KB2 must
hold.
We now state this formally. Let AXKB consist of the S5 axioms for the operators Ki, the K
axioms for the operators Bi, together with KB1; let AX
KB,CONS consist of AXKB together
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with the K4 and K5 axioms for Bi and KB2; and let AX
KB,CONS,NORM consist of AXKB,CONS
together with the K6 axiom for Bi.
Theorem 8 AXKB (resp., AXKB,CONS, AXKB,CONS,NORM) is a sound and complete axioma-
tization of LKB with respect to M (resp., MCONS, MCONS,NORM).
PROOF. See Appendix A.1. ✷
As an immediate corollary, we get that there is a close relationship between our framework
and that of [KL88]. Let KL be the logic of Kraus and Lehmann:
Corollary 9 For any φ ∈ LKB, KL |= φ if and only if MCONS,NORM |= φ.
We now relate to three other notions of beliefs in the literature—those of Moses and Shoham
[MS93], Voorbraak [Voo92], and Lamarre and Shoham [LS94].
Moses and Shoham [MS93] also view belief as being derived from knowledge. The intuition
that they try to capture is that once the agent makes a defeasible assumption, the rest of
his beliefs should follow from his knowledge. In this sense, Moses and Shoham can be viewed
as focusing on the implications of an assumption and not on how it was obtained. We can
understand their notion as saying that φ is believed if it is known to be true in the most
plausible worlds. But for them, plausibility is not defined by an ordering. Rather, it is defined
in terms of a formula, which can be thought of as characterizing the most plausible worlds.
More formally, for a fixed formula α, they define Bαi φ to be an abbreviation for Ki(α⇒ φ).
7
The following result relates our notion of belief to that of Moses and Shoham.
Lemma 10 Let M be a propositional Kripke structure of knowledge and plausibility satis-
fying CONS and SDP. Suppose that w, i, and α are such that the most plausible worlds in
Pi(w) are exactly those worlds in Ki(w) that satisfy α, i.e., MP(Pi(w)) = {w
′ ∈ Ki(w) :
(M,w′) |= α}. Then for any formula φ ∈ LKB that includes only the modalities Ki and Bi,
(M,w) |= φ if and only if (M,w) |= φ∗, where φ∗ is the result of recursively replacing each
subformula of the form Biψ in φ by Ki(α⇒ ψ
∗).
PROOF. See Appendix A.1. ✷
Voorbraak [Voo92] distinguishes two notions of knowledge: objective knowledge and true
justified belief . He then studies the interaction of both notions of knowledge with beliefs. The
intuition we assign to knowledge is similar to Voorbraak’s intuition for objective knowledge.
7 Shoham and Moses also examine two variants of this definition. These mainly deal with the
cases where α is inconsistent with the agent’s knowledge. For simplicity, we assume here that α is
consistent with the agent’s knowledge.
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However, Voorbraak objects to the axiom Kiφ ⇒ Biφ, and suggests Biφ ⇒ BiKiφ. The
difference lies in the interpretation of belief. Voorbraak’s notion of belief is stronger than
ours. His view is that the agent cannot distinguish what he believes from what he knows
(indeed, he believes that what he believes is the same as what he knows). Our notion of
belief is weaker, in that we allow agents to be aware of the defeasibility of their beliefs.
Lamarre and Shoham [LS94] investigate the notion of knowledge as justified true belief using
a framework that is very similar to ours. They start with an explicit preference ordering
over possible worlds, and then define Bαφ to read “given evidence α, φ holds in the most
plausible α-worlds”. Their formal account of Bαφ is exactly α→i φ in our notation. Unlike
us, they examine a notion of knowledge as “belief stable under incorporation of correct
facts”, which is rather different then our notion of objective knowledge. Thus, while the
technical construction is similar, the resulting framework is substantially different. Lamarre
and Shoham take plausibility to be the only primitive, and use it to determine both knowledge
and belief. We take both knowledge and plausibility to be primitive, and use them to define
belief.
2.8 Axiomatizing the Language of Knowledge and Plausibility
Up to now, we have considered just the restricted language LKB. We now present sound
and complete axiomatizations for the full language LKC. The technical details are much in
the spirit of the axiomatizations presented in [FH94a] for knowledge and probability. Our
complete axiomatization for M consists of two “modules”: a complete axiomatization for
knowledge (i.e., S5) and a complete axiomatization for conditionals. In the general case,
there are no axioms connecting knowledge and plausibility. For each of the conditions we
consider, we provide an axiom that characterizes it. The axioms characterizing NORM, REF,
RANK, and UNIF are taken from [Lew73] and [Bur81] (see also [Fri97,FH97b]), while the
axioms for CONS and SDP (and also UNIF) correspond directly to the axioms suggested
in [FH94a] for their probabilistic counterparts. We also provide complete characterizations
of the complexity of the validity problem for all the logics considered, based on complexity
results for knowledge [HM92] and for conditionals [FH96a].
The axiom system can be modularized into three components: propositional reasoning, rea-
soning about knowledge, and reasoning about conditionals. The component for propositional
reasoning consists of K1 and RK1 (from Section 2.1); the component for reasoning about
knowledge consists of K2–K5 and RK2 (from Section 2.1); the component for reasoning
about conditionals consists of the standard axioms and rules for conditional logic C1–C4,
RC1, and RC2 described in [Fri97,FH97b] following [Bur81,Lew73]:
C1. φ→ φ
C2. ((φ→ ψ1) ∧ (φ→ ψ2))⇒ (φ→ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2))
C3. ((φ1 → ψ) ∧ (φ2 → ψ))⇒ ((φ1 ∨ φ2)→ ψ)
C4. ((φ1 → φ2) ∧ (φ1 → ψ))⇒ ((φ1 ∧ φ2)→ ψ)
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R1. From φ and φ⇒ ψ infer ψ
RC1. From φ⇔ φ′ infer (φ→ ψ)⇒ (φ′ → ψ)
RC2. From ψ ⇒ ψ′ infer (φ→ ψ)⇒ (φ→ ψ′)
Let AX consist of K1–K5, C1–C4, RK1, RK2, RC1, and RC2.
Theorem 11 AX is a sound and complete axiomatization for LKC with respect to M.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
We now capture the conditions described above—CONS, NORM, REF, SDP, UNIF, and
RANK—axiomatically.
RANK, NORM, REF, and UNIF correspond the axioms C5–C8, respectively, from [Fri97,FH97b]:
C5. φ→ ψ ∧ ¬(φ→ ¬ξ)⇒ φ ∧ ξ → ψ
C6. ¬(true→ false).
C7. Nφ→ φ
C8. [(φ→ ψ)⇒ N(φ→ ψ)] ∧ [¬(φ→ ψ)⇒ N¬(φ→ ψ)]
CONS and SDP correspond to the following axioms, respectively;
C9. Kiφ⇒ Niφ
C10. (φ→i ψ)⇒ Ki(φ→i ψ)
It is interesting to note that the axioms for CONS and UNIF are derived from the axioms
defined in [FH94a] by replacing w(φ) = 1 (the probability of φ is 1) by Niφ, which has
a similar reading. We show that adding the appropriate axioms to AX gives a sound and
complete axiomatization of the logic with respect to the class of structures satisfying the
corresponding conditions.
Theorem 12 Let A be a subset of {RANK,NORM,REF,UNIF,CONS, SDP} and let A
be the corresponding subset of {C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10}. Then AX ∪ A is a sound and
complete axiomatization with respect to the structures in M satisfying A.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
We now consider the complexity of the validity problem. Our results are based on a combi-
nation of results for complexity of epistemic logics [HM92] and conditional logics [FH96a].
Again, the technical details are much in the spirit of those in [FH94a].
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We start with few results that will be useful in our discussion of complexity. As is often the
case in modal logics, we can prove a “small model property” for our logic: if a formula is
satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a small model. Let Sub(φ) be the set of subformulas in φ.
It is easy to see that an upper bound on |Sub(φ)| is the number of symbols in φ.
Theorem 13 Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. The formula
φ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable in a Kripke
structure with at most 2|Sub(φ)| worlds.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
This shows that if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable in a model with at most exponential
number of worlds. Such a “small model” result is useful when we consider upper bound on
the complexity of checking satisfiable. Roughly speaking, if there is a small model, then we
can construct this model in time, say, exponential in the size of the formula. However, there
is one problem with the result we have just proved. This “small” number of worlds does not
necessarily mean that we can compactly describe the Kripke structure. Recall that Pl(w,i)
describes an ordering over subsets of W(w,i). Thus, in the worst case, we need to describe
an ordering on 2|W(w,i)| sets of worlds. Thus, the representation of a structure might be
exponential in the number of worlds. Fortunately, we can show that a satisfiable formula is
satisfiable in a small model with a compact representation.
We start with a definition. We say that M = (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn,P1, . . . ,Pn) is a preferential
(Kripke) structure if for each Pi(w), there is a preference ordering ≺(w,i) on W(w,i) that
induces Pl(w,i) using the construction of Proposition 2. Recall that a preference ordering is a
binary relation on the set of possible worlds. Thus, ifW is finite, we can describe the relations
Ki and the preference orderings ≤(w,i) using tables of size at most |W |
2. So the representation
of such structures is polynomial in |W |. Is it possible to find a small preferential Kripke
structure satisfying φ? Indeed we can. Using results of [FH96a], we immediately get the
following lemma:
Lemma 14 Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. If a formula
φ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A with N worlds, then φ is satisfiable in a
preferential Kripke structure with at most |Sub(φ)|N worlds.
Combining this with Theorem 13, we conclude that if φ is satisfiable, then it is satisfiable
in a structure of exponential size with an exponential description. It can be shown that this
result is essentially optimal (see [HM92,FH96a]). However, if there is only one agent and we
assume CONS and either UNIF or SDP, then we can get polynomial-sized models.
Theorem 15 Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} containing
CONS and either SDP or UNIF. If φ talks about the knowledge and plausibility of only one
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agent, then φ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable
in a preferential Kripke structure satisfying A with at most |Sub(φ)|3 worlds.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
We now consider the complexity of decision procedure for the validity problem. The difficulty
of deciding whether φ is valid is a function of the length of φ, written |φ|.
Theorem 16 Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. If CONS ∈
A, but it is not the case that UNIF or SDP is in A, then the validity problem with respect
to structures satisfying A is complete for exponential time. Otherwise, the validity problem
is complete for polynomial space.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
If we restrict attention to the case of one agent and structures satisfying CONS and either
UNIF or SDP, then we can do better.
Theorem 17 Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} containing
CONS and either UNIF or SDP. For the case of one agent, the validity problem in models
satisfying A is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. See Appendix A.2. ✷
3 Adding Time
In the previous section, we developed a model of knowledge and beliefs. Having a good model
of knowledge and belief is not enough in order to study how beliefs change. Indeed, if we are
mainly interested in agents’ beliefs, the additional structure of plausibility spaces does not
play a significant role in a static setting. However, if we introduce an explicit notion of time,
we expect the plausibility measure to (partially) determine how agents change their beliefs.
As we shall see, this gives a reasonable notion of belief change.
In this section, we introduce time into the framework. We then examine how time, knowledge,
and plausibility interact. In particular, we suggest a notion of conditioning that captures the
intuition that plausibility changes in the minimal way that is required by changes to the
agent’s knowledge.
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3.1 Knowledge and Plausibility in Multi-Agent Systems
A straightforward approach to adding time is by introducing another accessibility relation
on worlds, which characterizes their temporal relationship (see, for example, [KL88]). We
introduce more structure into the description by adopting the framework of Halpern and
Fagin [HF89] for modeling multi-agent systems. This structure gives a natural definition of
knowledge and an intuitive way to describe agents’ interactions with their environment. We
start by describing the framework of Halpern and Fagin, and then add plausibility.
The key assumption in this framework is that we can characterize the system by describing
it in terms of a state that changes over time. This is a powerful and natural way to model
systems. Formally, we assume that at each point in time, each agent is in some local state.
Intuitively, this local state encodes the information that is available to the agent at that time.
In addition, there is an environment, whose state encodes relevant aspects of the system that
are not part of the agents’ local states. For example, if we are modeling a robot that navigates
in some office building, we might encode the robot’s sensor input as part of the robot’s local
state. If the robot is uncertain about his position, we would encode this position in the
environment state.
A global state is a tuple (se, s1, . . . , sn) consisting of the environment state se and the local
state si of each agent i. A run of the system is a function from time (which, for ease of
exposition, we assume ranges over the natural numbers) to global states. Thus, if r is a
run, then r(0), r(1), . . . is a sequence of global states that, roughly speaking, is a complete
description of what happens over time in one possible execution of the system. We take a
system to consist of a set of runs. Intuitively, these runs describe all the possible sequences
of events that could occur in a system.
Given a system R, we refer to a pair (r,m) consisting of a run r ∈ R and a time m as a point.
If r(m) = (se, s1, . . . , sn), we define ri(m) = si; thus, ri(m) is agent i’s local state at the
point (r,m). Finally, to reason in a logical language about such a system, we need to assign
truth values to primitive propositions. An interpreted system is a tuple (R, π) consisting of a
system R together with a mapping π that associates a truth assignment with the primitive
propositions at each state of the system.
An interpreted plausibility system can be viewed as a Kripke structure for knowledge. We
say two points (r,m) and (r′, m′) are indistinguishable to agent i, and write (r,m) ∼i (r
′, m′),
if ri(m) = r
′
i(m
′), i.e., if the agent has the same local state at both points. This is consistent
with the intuition that an agent’s local state encodes all the information available to the
agent. Taking ∼i to define the Ki relation, we get a Kripke structure over points.
8
This definition of knowledge has proved useful in many applications in distributed systems
and AI (see [FHMV95] and the references therein). As argued above, we want to add the
8 It is straightforward to extend these definitions to deal with continuous time. This is done, for
example, in [BLMS97].
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notion of plausibility so that we can model the agent’s beliefs. It is straightforward to do
so by adding a plausibility assessment for each agent at each point. Formally, an interpreted
plausibility system is a tuple I = (R, π,P1, . . . ,Pn), where R and π are as before, and
the plausibility assignment Pi maps each point (r,m) to a plausibility space Pi(r,m) =
(W(r,m,i),Pl(r,m,i)).
In order to reason about the temporal aspects of the system, we add to the language temporal
modalities in the standard fashion (see [GPSS80]). These include ©φ for “φ is true at the
next time step” We call this language LKCT . Evaluation of temporal modalities at a point
(r,m) is done by examining the future points on the run r: Given a point (r,m) in an
interpreted system I, we have that
• (I, r,m) |=©φ if (I, r,m+ 1) |= φ. 9
This framework is clearly a temporal extension of the logic of knowledge and plausibility
described in the previous section.
3.2 Example: Circuit Diagnosis Revisited
We now show how the framework can be used to extend the example of Section 2.5 to
incorporate time, allowing the agent to perform a sequence of tests.
We want to model the process of diagnosis. That is, we want to model the agent’s beliefs about
the circuit while it performs a sequence of tests, and how the observations at each step affects
her beliefs. Thus, we want to model the agent and the circuit as part of a system. To do so, we
need to describe the agent’s local state and the state of the environment. The construction
we used in Section 2.5 provides a natural division between the two: The agent’s state is
the sequence of input–output relations observed, while the environment’s state describes the
faulty components of the circuit and the values of all the lines. This corresponds to our
intuitions, since the agent can observe only the input–output relations. Each run describes
the results of a specific series of tests the agent performs and the results he observes. We make
two additional assumptions: (1) the agent does not forget what tests were performed and their
results, and (2) the faults are persistent and do not change over time. Formally, we define the
agent’s state r1(m) to be 〈o(r,0), . . . , o(r,m)〉, where o(r,m) describes the input–output relation
observed at time m. We define the environment state re(m) = (fault(r,m), value(r,m)) to be
the failure set at (r) and the values of all the lines. We capture the assumption that faults do
not change by requiring that fault(r,m) = fault(r, 0). The system Rdiag consists of all runs
r satisfying these requirements in which value(r,m) is consistent with fault(r,m) and o(r,m)
for all m.
Given the system Rdiag, we can define two interpreted plausibility systems corresponding
9 It is easy to add other temporal modalities such as until, eventually, since, etc. These do not
play a role in this work.
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to the two plausibility measures we considered in Section 2.5. In both systems, W(r,m,1) =
Ki(r,m). In Idiag,1, we compare two points (r1, m) and (r2, m) by comparing the size of
fault(r1, m) and fault(r2, m), while in Idiag,2 we check whether one failure set is a subset of
the other. At a point (r,m), the agent considers possible all the points where he performed
the same tests up to time m and observed the same results. As before, the agent believes that
the failure set is one of the minimal explanations of his observations. As the agent performs
more tests, his knowledge increases and his beliefs might change.
We define Bel(I, r,m) to be the set of failure sets (i.e., diagnoses) that the agent considers
possible at (r,m). Belief change in Idiag,1 is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 18 If there is some f ∈ Bel(Idiag,1, r,m) that is consistent with the new ob-
servation o(r,m+1), then Bel(Idiag,1, r,m+1) consists of all the failure sets in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m)
that are consistent with o(r,m+1). If all f ∈ B(Idiag,1, r,m) are inconsistent with o(r,m+1), then
B(Idiag,1, r,m+1) consists of all failure sets of cardinality j that are consistent with o(r,m+1),
where j is the least cardinality for which there is at least one failure set consistent with
o(r,m+1).
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
Thus, in Idiag,1, a new observation consistent with the current set of most likely explana-
tions reduces this set (to those consistent with the new observation). On the other hand,
a surprising observation (one inconsistent with the current set of most likely explanations)
has a rather drastic effect. It easily follows from Proposition 18 that if o(r,m+1) is surpris-
ing, then Bel(Idiag,1, r,m) ∩ Bel(Idiag,1, r,m + 1) = ∅, so the agent discards all his current
explanations in this case. Moreover, an easy induction on m shows that if Bel(Idiag,1, r,m)∩
Bel(Idiag,1, r,m + 1) = ∅, then the cardinality of the failure sets in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m + 1) is
greater than the cardinality of failure sets in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m). Thus, in this case, the expla-
nations in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m + 1) are more complicated than those in B(Idiag,1, r,m). Notice
that if we can characterize the observation o(r,m+1) in our language—that is, if we have a
formula φ such (I, r′, m′) |= φ if and only if o(r′,m′) = o(r,m+1)—then we can also express the
fact that agent i considers it surprising: This is true precisely if (Idiag,1, r,m) |= Bi¬©φ.
Belief change in Idiag,2 is quite different, as the following proposition shows. Given a failure
set f , we define ext(f) = {f ′ : f ⊆ f ′}. Thus, ext(f) consists of all the failure sets that
extend f .
Proposition 19 Bel(Idiag,2, r,m + 1) consists of the minimal (according to ⊆) failure sets
in ∪
f∈Bel(Idiag,2,r,m)
ext(f) that are consistent with o(r,m+1).
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
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We see that, as with Idiag,1, failure sets that are consistent with the new observation are
retained. However, unlike Idiag,1, failure sets that are discarded are replaced by more com-
plicated failure sets even if some of the explanations considered most likely at (r,m) are
consistent with the new observation. Moreover, while new failure sets in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m+1)
can be unrelated to failure sets in Bel(Idiag,1, r,m), in Idiag,2 the new failure sets must be
extensions of some discarded failure sets. Thus, in Idiag,1 the agent does not consider new
failure sets as long as the observation is not surprising. On the other hand, in Idiag,2 the
agent has to examine new candidates after each test. The latter behavior is essentially that
described by Reiter [Rei87, Section 5].
3.3 Axiomatizing the Language of Knowledge, Plausibility and Time
We now present sound and complete axiomatization for the language LKCT . The technical
details are much in the spirit of the results of Section 2.8, with two exceptions. First, we
need to deal also with the temporal modality ©. Second, instead of dealing with worlds,
we are dealing with systems that have some structure, i.e., the distinction between agents’
local state and the environment’s state. As we shall see, both issues can be dealt with in a
straightforward manner.
The axiom system AXT consists of the axioms and rule in the axiom system AX of Section 2.8
and the following axioms and rule the describe the properties of ©:.
T1. ©φ ∧©(φ⇒ ψ)⇒ ©ψ
T2. ©φ ≡ ¬©¬φ
RT1. From φ infer ©φ.
Let C be the set of all plausibility interpreted systems.
Theorem 20 The axiom system AXT is a sound and complete axiomatization of LKCT with
respect to C.
PROOF. See Appendix A.3. ✷
We can also prove a result analogous to Theorem 12 that describes a complete axiomatization
for the classes of systems satisfying some of the assumptions we examined in Section 2.4.
Theorem 21 Let A be a subset of {RANK,NORM,REF,UNIF,CONS, SDP} and let A be
the corresponding subset of {C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10}. Then AXT ∪ A is a sound and
complete axiomatization with respect to systems in C satisfying A.
PROOF. See Appendix A.3. ✷
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4 Prior Plausibilities
The formal framework of knowledge, plausibility and time described in the previous section
raises a serious problem: While it is easy to see where the ∼i relations that define knowledge
come from, the same cannot be said for the plausibility spaces Pi(r,m). We now present one
possible answer to this question, inspired by probability theory.
Up to now, we have allowed the plausibility assessment at each point to be almost arbitrary.
In particular, the plausibility space Pi(r,m) can be quite different from Pi(r,m + 1). Typ-
ically, we would expect there to be some relationship between these successive plausibility
assessments. For example, it seems reasonable to expect that the new plausibility assessment
should incorporate whatever was learned at (r,m+1), but otherwise involve minimal changes
from Pi(r,m).
One way of doing this in probability theory is by conditioning. If we start with a probability
function Pr and observe E, where Pr(E) > 0, then the conditional probability function PrE
is defined so that PrE(A) = Pr(A∩E)/Pr(E). Typically PrE(A) is denoted Pr(A|E). Notice
that PrE incorporates the new information E by giving it probability 1. It also is a minimal
change from Pr in the sense that if A,B ⊆ E, then Pr(A)/Pr(B) = Pr(A|E)/Pr(B|E): the
relative probability of events consistent with E is not changed by conditioning. 10
Conditioning is a standard technique in probability theory, and can be justified in a number
of ways, one of which is the notion of “minimal change” we have just described. Another
justification is a “Dutch book” argument [Fin72,Ram31], which shows that if an agent uses
some other method of updating probabilities, then it is possible to construct a betting game
in which he will always lose. Probability measures are particular instances of plausibility
measures. Can we generalize the notion of conditioning to plausibility measures?
It immediately follows from the definitions that the ordering of the likelihood of events
induced by PrE is determined by the ordering induced by Pr:
Pr(A|E) ≤ Pr(B|E) if and only if Pr(A ∩ E) ≤ Pr(B ∩ E).
We want the analogous property for plausibility:
COND Pl(A|C) ≤ Pl(B|C) if and only if Pl(A ∩ C) ≤ Pl(B ∩ C).
This rule determines the order induced by posterior plausibilities. Since we are interested
only in this aspect of plausibility, any method of conditioning that satisfies COND will do for
10 There is another sense in which PrE represents the minimal change from Pr. If we measure the
“distance” of a probability distribution Pr′ from Pr in terms of the cross-entropy of Pr′ relative
to Pr, then it is well known that PrE is the distribution that minimizes the relative cross-entropy
from Pr among all distributions Pr′ such that Pr′(E) = 1 [KL51]. Indeed, this holds true for other
distance measures as well [DZ82].
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our present purposes. (See [FH95] for an examination of other properties we might require of
conditioning.) Notice that any two methods for conditioning are isomorphic in the following
sense: Let S1 = (W1,Pl1) and S2 = (W2,Pl2) be two plausibility spaces. We say that S1 and
S2 are (order) isomorphic if there is a bijection h from W1 to W2 such that, for A,B ⊆W1,
we have Pl1(A) ≤ Pl1(B) if and only if Pl2(h(A)) ≤ Pl2(h(B)). Any two definitions of
conditioning that satisfy COND result in order-isomorphic plausibility spaces (see [FH95]).
This discussion suggests that we define Pl(r,m+1,i) to be the result of conditioning Pl(r,m,i)
on the new knowledge gained by agent i at (r,m+ 1). This, however, leads to the following
technical problem. If the agent gains new knowledge at (r,m+ 1), then ri(m) 6= ri(m+ 1).
This implies that the sets of points the agent considers possible are disjoint, i.e., Ki(r,m) ∩
Ki(r,m+1) = ∅. But then CONS implies that Pl(r,m,i) and Pl(r,m+1,i) are defined over disjoint
spaces, so we cannot apply COND.
We circumvent this difficulty by working at the level of runs. The approach we propose
resembles the Bayesian approach to probabilities. Bayesians assume that agents start with
priors on all possible events. If we were thinking probabilistically, we could imagine the agents
in a multi-agent system starting with priors on the runs in the system. Since a run describes
a complete history over time, this means that the agents are putting a prior probability
on the sequences of events that could happen. We would then expect the agent to modify
his prior by conditioning on whatever information he has learned. This is essentially the
approach taken in [HT93] to defining how the agents’ probability distribution changes in a
multi-agent system. We can do the analogous thing with plausibility.
We start by making the simplifying assumption that we are dealing with synchronous systems
where agents have perfect recall [HV89]. Intuitively, this means that the agents know what the
time is and do not forget the observations they have made. Formally, a system is synchronous
if for any i, (r,m) ∼i (r
′, m′) only if m = m′. Notice that by restricting to synchronous
systems, if we further assume that the plausibility measure Pi(r,m) satisfies CONS, we never
have to compare the plausibilities of two different points on the same run. In synchronous
systems, agent i has perfect recall if (r′, m+1) ∼i (r,m+1) implies (r
′, m) ∼i (r,m). Thus,
agent i considers run r possible at the point (r,m + 1) only if he also considers it possible
at (r,m). This means that any runs considered impossible at (r,m) are also considered
impossible at (r,m+ 1); an agent does not forget what he knew.
Just as with probability, we assume that an agent has a prior plausibility measure on runs,
that describes his prior assessment on the possible executions of the system. As the agent
gains knowledge, he updates his prior by conditioning. More precisely, at each point (r,m),
the agent conditions his previous assessment on the set of runs considered possible at (r,m).
This is process is shown in Figure 2. This results in an updated assessment (posterior)
of the plausibility of runs. This posterior induces, via a projection from runs to points, a
plausibility measure on points. We can think of agent i’s posterior at time m as simply his
prior conditioned on his knowledge at time m.
To make this precise, let S = (W,Pl) be a plausibility space. Define the projection of S on
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Fig. 2. Schematic description of how the agent’s knowledge evolves in time in synchronous systems
with perfect recall. The boxes represent the set of points in Ki(r,m). Since the system is syn-
chronous, at each time point, the agent consider possible points at the same time. Since the agent
has perfect recall, as time progresses, the agent considers smaller and smaller sets of runs possible.
The ovals represent two disjoint events that correspond to the same set of runs.
E as S|E = (W |E,Pl|E), where W |E = W ∩ E and Pl|E is the restriction of Pl to W |E.
Projection is similar to conditioning: for any definition of conditioning that satisfies COND
if A,B ⊆ E, then Pl(A|E) ≤ Pl(B|E) if and only if Pl|E(A) ≤ Pl|E(B). Indeed, S|E is
essentially isomorphic to any conditional plausibility measure that results from conditioning
on E. 11
We can now define what it means for a plausibility measure on points to be generated by
a prior. Suppose that agent i’s prior plausibility at run r is P(r,i) = (R(r,i),Pl(r,i)), where
R(r,i) ⊆ R. Our intuition is that the agent conditions the prior by his knowledge at time
(r,m). In our framework, the agent’s knowledge at time m is the set of point Ki(r,m). We
need to convert this set of points to an event in terms of runs. If A is a set of points, we
define R(A) = {r : ∃m((r,m) ∈ A)} to be the set of runs on which the points in A lie. Using
this notation, the set of runs agent i considers possible at (r,m) is simply R(Ki(r,m)). Thus,
after conditioning on this set of runs, we get agent i’s posterior at (r,m), which is simply
the projection of the prior on the observation: Pl(r,i)|R(Ki(r,m)). We now use this plausibility
measure, which is a measure on a set of runs, to define Pi(r,m), which is a measure on a
set of points. We do so in the most straightforward way: we project each run to a point
that lies on it. Formally, we say that Pi(r,m) is the time m projection of P(r,i)|R(Ki(r,m))
11 To make this precise, we need a notion that is slightly more general than isomorphism. Let
P = (W,Pr) be a probability space. A set A is called a support of P if Pr(A) = 0. We can
define a similar notion for plausibility spaces. Let S = (W,Pl) be a plausibility space. We say that
A ⊆ W is a support of S, if for all B ⊆ W , Pl(B) = Pl(B ∩ A). Thus, only B ∩ A is relevant
for determining the plausibility of B. This certainly implies that Pl(A) = ⊥, since we must have
Pl(A) = Pl(A ∩ A) = Pl(∅), but the converse does not hold in general. In probability spaces,
Pr(A) = 0 implies that Pr(B) = Pr(B ∩ A) for all B, but the analogous condition does not hold
for arbitrary plausibility spaces. We say that two plausibility spaces S1 and S2 are essentially
(order) isomorphic if there are supports C1 and C2 of S1 and S2, respectively, such that S1|C1 is
isomorphic to S2|C2 . It is easy to see that, as expected, essential isomorphism defines an equivalence
relation among plausibility spaces. Finally, it is easy to see that if S = (W,Pl), then (W,Pl(·|E))
is essentially isomorphic to S|E when we use any conditioning method that satisfies COND.
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Fig. 3. Schematic description of the entities involved in the definition of priors. Note some are
defined over runs and some over points.
if Pi(r,m) = (W(r,m,i),Pl(r,m,i)), where W(r,m,i) = {(r
′, m) ∈ Ki(r,m) : r
′ ∈ R(r,i)} and for
all A ⊆ W(r,m,i), we have that Pl(r,m,i)(A) = Pl(r,i)|R(Ki(r,m))(R(A)). Pl(r,m,i) is the agent’s
plausibility measure at (r,m). This process is described in Figure 3. The main complications
are due to the transition back and forth between entities defined over runs and ones defined
over points.
We remark that if the system satisfies perfect recall as well as synchrony, our original intuition
that Pi(r,m+ 1) should be the result of conditioning Pi(r,m) on the knowledge that agent
i acquires at (r,m+ 1) can be captured more directly. We can in fact construct Pi(r,m+1)
from Pi(r,m) by what can be viewed as conditioning on the agent’s new information: We take
Pi(r,m) and project it one time step forward by replacing each point (r
′, m) by (r′, m+1). We
then condition on Ki(r,m+1) (i.e., the agent’s knowledge at (r,m+1)) to get Pi(r,m, i+1).
Proposition 22 Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall such that Pl(r,m,i)
is the time m projection of a prior Pl(r,i) on runs for all runs r, times m, and agents i.
Let prev(A) = {(r,m) : (r,m + 1) ∈ A}. Then Pl(r,m+1)(A) ≤ Pl(r,m+1)(B) if and only if
Pl(r,m)(prev(A)) ≤ Pl(r,m)(prev(B)), for all runs r, times m, and sets A,B ∈ W(r,m+1).
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
We say that I = (R, π,P) satisfies PRIOR if I is synchronous and for each run r and agent
i there is a prior plausibility P(r,i) such that for all m, Pi(r,m) is the time m projection of
P(r,i).
Example 23 It is easy to verify that the two systems we consider in Section 3.2 satisfy
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PRIOR. In both systems, the prior P(r,i) is independent of the run r, and is determined by
the failure set in each run.
By using prior plausibility measures, we have reduced the question of where the plausibility
measure at each point comes from to the simpler question of where the prior comes from.
While this question is far from trivial, it is analogous to a question that needs to be addressed
by anyone using a Bayesian approach. Just as with probability theory, in many applications
there is a natural prior (or class of priors) that we can use.
By conditioning on plausibility rather than probability, we can deal with a standard problem
in the Bayesian approach, that of conditioning on an event of measure 0: Notice that whenever
a prior assigns an event a probability measure of 0 it is not possible to condition on that
event. The standard solution in the Bayesian school is to give every event of interest, no
matter how unlikely, a small positive probability. 12 We may well discover that a formula φ
that we believed to be true, i.e., one that was true in all the most plausible worlds, is in fact
false. Under the probabilistic interpretation of plausibility, this means that we are essentially
conditioning on an event (¬φ) of measure 0. The plausibility approach has no problem with
this: the conditioning process described above still makes perfect sense.
4.1 Conditioning as Minimal Change of Belief
In this section we examine the properties of conditioning as an approach to minimal change
of beliefs and relate our approach to others in the literature.
Recall that QUAL guarantees that belief is closed under logical implication and conjunction
(Theorem 4). In a synchronous system where the prior satisfies QUAL, it is not hard to see
that conditioning preserves QUAL. Thus, we get the following result.
Proposition 24 Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If the
prior Pl(r,i) satisfies A2 for all runs r and agents i, then axiom K2 is valid in I for Bi.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
This result shows that condition A2 is sufficient to get beliefs that satisfy K2. Is it also
necessary? In general, the answer is no. However, A2 is the most natural condition that
ensures that K2 is satisfied. To see this, note that if K2 is valid in I then A2 holds for all
pairwise disjoint subsets A1, A2 and A3 of points in I definable in the language such that
R(Ki(r,m)) = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ A3 for some run r, agent i, and time m. Thus, if we assume that
the language is rich enough so that all subsets of I are definable (in that, for each subset A
12Of course, this requires that there be only countably many events of interest.
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and agent i, there is a formula φ and point (r,m) such that A = [[φ]](r,m,i)), then K2 forces
A2.
In view of this discussion, we focus in this section on synchronous systems with a qualitative
prior.
Next, we examine how changes in beliefs are determined by the prior. Using Proposition 22,
we now show that we can characterize, within our language, how the agent’s beliefs change
via conditioning, provided that we can describe in the language what knowledge the agent
acquired. We say that a formula φ characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r,m+1) with respect
to his knowledge at (r,m) if, for all (r′, m) ∈ Ki(r,m), we have (r
′, m+1) |= φ if and only if
(r′, m+1) ∈ Ki(r,m+1). That is, among the points that succeed points that are considered
possible at time m, exactly these satisfying φ are considered possible at time m + 1. Of
course, it is not always possible to characterize the agent’s new knowledge by a formula in
our language. However, in many applications we can limit our attention to systems where
it is possible. (This is the case, for example, in our treatment of revision and update in
[Fri97,FH97a].) In such systems, we can characterize within the agent’s belief change process
in the language.
Proposition 25 Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If φ
characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r,m+ 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r,m), then
(I, r,m+ 1) |= ψ →i ξ if and only if (I, r,m) |= ©(φ ∧ ψ)→i ©ξ.
PROOF. See Appendix A.4. ✷
Corollary 26 Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If φ
characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r,m+ 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r,m), then
(I, r,m+ 1) |= Biψ if and only if (I, r,m) |= Ki(©φ⇒ (©φ→i ©ψ)). Moreover, if I also
satisfies SDP, then (I, r,m+ 1) |= Biψ if and only if (I, r,m) |= ©φ→i ©ψ.
We now use this result to relate our approach to other approaches for modeling conditionals
in the literature. Boutilier [Bou92], Goldszmidt and Pearl [GP92], and Lamarre and Shoham
[LS94] give conditional statements similar semantics (using a preference ordering), but φ→ ψ
is read “after learning φ, ψ is believed”. Two crucial assumptions are made in these papers.
The first is that the agent considers only one plausibility assessment, which in our terminology
amounts to SDP. The second is that propositions are static, i.e., their truth value does not
change along a run. 13 Formally, a system is static if π(r(m)) = π(r(0)) for all runs r and
times m. This implies that for any propositional formula φ, we have that φ ≡ ©φ. These
two assumptions lead to a characterization of belief change.
Corollary 27 Let I be a synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, SDP, and perfect
recall, and let φ and ψ be propositional formulas. If φ characterizes agent i’s knowledge at
13 This assumption is only implicit, since none of these papers have an explicit representation of
time. Nevertheless, it is clear that this assumption is being made.
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(r,m + 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r,m), then (I, r,m + 1) |= Biψ if and only if
(I, r,m) |= φ→i ψ.
While this result shows that, in certain contexts, there is a connection between a statement
such as “typically φ’s are ψ’s” (which is how we have between interpreting φ→i ψ) and “after
learning φ, ψ is believed” (which is how it is interpreted in [Bou92,GP92,LS94]), the two
readings are in general quite different. For one thing, notice that Corollary 27 assumes that φ
and ψ are propositional formulas. This is a necessary assumption. If φ and ψ contain modal
formulas, then φ→ ψ does not necessarily imply that the agent believes ψ at the next time
step. For example, if (I, r,m) |= Biψ, then for any formula φ, we have (I, r,m) |= φ→i Biψ,
regardless of whether Biψ is believed at (r,m+ 1). In [FH94b], we examine conditionals of
the form φ > ψ intended to capture the second interpretation “ψ is believed after learning
φ”. The semantics for these conditionals involves examining future time points, just as our
intuitive reading dictates. As we have just seen, > and→ are quite different when we consider
modal formulas in the scope of these conditionals.
This discussion shows one of the benefits of representing time explicitly. In our framework
we can distinguish between agents’ plausibility assessment and their belief dynamics. Of
course, we would like agents to be persistent in their assessment, which is exactly what
conditioning captures. In the presence of several assumptions, we get a close connection
between agents’ conditional beliefs and how their beliefs change. This allows us to identify
some of the assumptions implicitly made in previous approaches. For example, all of the
approaches we mentioned above would not apply when we consider a changing environment,
since they cannot reason about how the environment changes between one time point and
the next.
Finally, we examine the work of Battigalli and Bonanno [BB97]. They consider a logic of
knowledge, belief, and time, and attempt to capture properties of “minimal change” of beliefs.
Their language is slightly different from ours. Instead of introducing a temporal modality,
they define a different belief and knowledge modality for each time step: Btφ reads “the
agent believes φ at time t”. Battigalli and Bonanno also assume that propositions are static
and do not change in time. Thus, the only changes are in terms of the agent’s knowledge
and belief. Battigalli and Bonanno propose an axiom system similar to the axioms of Kraus
and Lehmann (that is, they use K5 for knowledge is K5, KD45 for belief, and take axioms
KB1 and KB2 of Section 2.7 to characterize the connection between knowledge and belief)
that also includes two additional axioms that can be written in our language as
BT1. Bi©Biφ⇒ Biφ
BT2. Biφ⇒ Bi©Biφ
Battigalli and Bonanno claim that these axioms capture the principle that the agent does
not change her mind unless new knowledge forces her to do so. Intuitively, this principle
also applies to conditioning, and thus it is instructive to understand when these axioms are
satisfied in our framework.
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It turns out that RANK combined with a minimal assumption implies both BT1 and BT2.
We say that a system has finite branching if it allows only finitely many “branches” at each
local state of an agent (that is there are only finitely many observations that an agent can
make at each point).
Lemma 28 Let I be a synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, RANK, SDP, and
perfect recall that has finite branching. Then (I, r,m) |= Biφ⇔ Bi©Biφ for all propositional
formulas φ.
PROOF. See Appendix A.4. ✷
Are these conditions necessary to characterize BT1 and BT2? The answer is no. First, the
proof of Lemma 28 applies to systems with infinite branching, if the agents’ prior satisfies
an infinitary version of A2. As shown in [FHK96], this infinitary version is satisfied by
κ-rankings and preference orderings that are well founded (that is, they have no infinite
descending sequences · · · ≺ w3 ≺ w2 ≺ w1). Thus, any system with static propositions
whose prior is induced by a well-founded preference order satisfies BT1 and BT2. Note that
BT1 and BT2 do not characterize RANK, since they put restrictions only on certain events
(ones definable by a conjunction of a formula and the agent’s new knowledge at some time
point). However, RANK is the most natural restriction that implies these axioms.
Thus, we see that Battigalli and Bonanno essentially require systems with minimal change
to satisfy conditioning with a prior that is a ranking. As we shall see in the next section,
similar requirements are made by the AGM formulation of belief revision [AGM85].
4.2 Properties of Prior Plausibilities
If we take the plausibilities in a system to be generated by a prior, then many of the conditions
we are interested in, such as QUAL and REF, can be viewed as being as being induced
by the analogous property on the prior. We have considered these properties only in the
context of Kripke structures for knowledge and probability, so to make sense of the prior
having the “analogous property”, we have to be able to view the set of runs as a Kripke
structure for knowledge and probability. Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect
recall and PRIOR. Define M rI = (R, π
r,Kr1, . . . ,K
r
n,P
r
i , . . . ,P
r
n), where π
r is an arbitrary
truth assignment, Kri is the full relation, i.e., R×R, and P
r
i (r) = P(r,i), the prior of agent i
at run r.
Proposition 29 Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If M rI
satisfies QUAL, REF, SDP, UNIF or RANK, then so does I.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
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Thus, by constructing priors that satisfy various properties, we can ensure that the resulting
system also satisfies them. In particular, Proposition 29 implies that if P(r,i) is independent
of r, so that agent i’s prior is independent of the run he is in, then I satisfies SDP. A
somewhat weaker assumption—that the set of runs can be partitioned into disjoint subsets
R1, . . . ,Rk such that for r, r
′ ∈ Rj , we have P(r,i) = P(r′,i) = (Rj ,Plj)—ensures that I
satisfies UNIF. Intuitively, the sets Rj correspond to different settings of parameters. Once
we set the parameters, then we fix the plausibility measure (and it is the same at all runs
that have the same setting of the parameters).
We conclude this section by examining whether assuming conditioning limits the expres-
siveness of our belief change operation. A well-known result of Diaconis and Zabell [DZ82]
that shows that, in a precise sense, any form of coherent probabilistic belief change can be
described by conditioning. In particular, they show that, given two probability distributions
Pr and Pr′ on a finite space W that are coherent in the sense that Pr(A) = 0 implies that
Pr′(A) = 0, there is a space W ∗ of the form W × X , a subset E of W ∗, and a distribution
Pr′′ on W ∗ such that, for all A ⊆ W , we have Pr′′(A × X) = Pr(A) (so that Pr′′ can be
viewed as an extension of Pr) and Pr′(A) = Pr′′(A×X|E).
We can prove a result in a somewhat similar spirit in our framework. The first step is to
define a plausibilistic analogue of coherence in systems.
Let I be a synchronous system. We say that I is coherent if the following condition is
satisfied for all r and m: Suppose R ⊆ R, Am ⊆W(r,m,i), R(A
m) = R∩R(W(r,m,i)), A
m+1 ⊆
W(r,m+1,i), and R(A
m+1) = R ∩ R(W(r,m+1,i)). If Pl(r,m,i)(A
m) = ⊥, then Pl(r,m+1,i)(A
m+1) =
⊥. Despite the different formulation, this condition is analogous to the probabilistic coherence
of Diaconis and Zabell. Roughly speaking, if a set of runs has plausibility ⊥ (which is
analogous to probability 0 for Diaconis and Zabell) at time m, then it is required to have
plausibility ⊥ at time m+1. More precisely, coherence of a system ensures that sets of runs
that were considered implausible at (r,m), either by being outside W(r,m,i) or by being given
plausibility ⊥(r,m,i), are also considered implausible at (r,m + 1). Note, this condition does
not put any constraints on how the runs that are considered possible are ordered. It is easy
to verify that the following axiom is valid in coherent systems:
COH. Ni©φ⇒ ©Niφ
Proposition 30 If I is a synchronous and coherent system, then COH is valid in I.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
There is a sense in which the converse to Proposition 30 holds as well: Given a synchronous
system that is not coherent, we can define a truth assignment π in this system for which
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COH does not hold. 14
It is easy to see that coherence is a necessary condition for satisfying PRIOR.
Proposition 31 If I is a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR, then I
is coherent.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
Thus, PRIOR forces systems to be coherent, and hence to satisfy COH. It also forces systems
to satisfy CONS, and hence C5. As we shall see, it also forces some other semantic properties.
Nevertheless, we can show that for coherent systems that satisfy CONS, PRIOR does not
force any additional properties, by proving an analogue to the Diaconis and Zabell result in
our framework.
We say that a formula φ ∈ LKCT is temporally linear if temporal modalities in φ do not
appear in the scope of the Ki or →i modalities. Thus, for example, a formula such as
(φ →i ψ) ⇒ ©Biψ is temporally linear, while Ki(©φ →i ©ψ) ⇒ ©Biψ is not. Temporal
linearity ensures that all the temporal connectives in φ are evaluated with respect to a single
run. The following result says that, at least for temporally linear formulas, we can view belief
change in a coherent system I as coming from conditioning on a prior, in the sense that we
can embed I into a larger system where this is the case.
Theorem 32 Let A be a subset of {QUAL,NORM,REF,RANK} and let I be a coherent
synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, and A. Then there is a synchronous
system I ′ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping f : R 7→ R′ such that for
all temporally linear formulas φ ∈ LKCT , we have (I, r,m) |= φ if and only if (I ′, f(r), m) |=
φ. 15
PROOF. See Appendix A.5. ✷
Notice that formulas that just compare an agent’s beliefs (or knowledge) at successive time
points are temporally linear. All the AGM postulates and the KM postulates (when trans-
lated to our language) are of this form. Not surprisingly, as we show in [Fri97,FH97a], these
postulates can be captured by systems with the appropriate prior plausibility.
14We remark that COH is analogous to the axiom Ki©φ⇒©Kiφ that characterizes perfect recall
in synchronous systems [FHMV95]. Roughly speaking, this is because coherence ensures that the
agent does not forget what she ruled out as implausible.
15We note that this result is, in a sense, stronger than Diaconis and Zabell’s. They examine only
the probability of events, which are essentially propositional formulas (i.e., formulas without modal
operators).
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Can we extend Theorem 32 to the full language? We conjecture that Theorem 32 actually
holds for all φ ∈ LKCT , not just temporally linear formulas. This conjecture implies that a
formula is valid with respect to synchronous systems satisfying perfect recall, CONS, and
PRIOR if and only if it is valid with respect to synchronous coherent systems satisfying
CONS and perfect recall. That is, except for COH and C9, we do not get any new properties
by assuming PRIOR and CONS.
Note that the construction described by Theorem 32 does not necessarily preserve SDP or
UNIF in the transformation from I to I ′. This is due to the fact that in the presence of SDP
or UNIF, PRIOR forces new semantic properties. Recall that UNIF implies that there is a
partition of possible points such that two points (r,m) and (r′, m′) are in the same cell if and
only if Pi(r,m) = Pi(r
′, m′). Let PERSIST be the requirement that this partition changes
minimally in time. More precisely, we say that a system satisfies PERSIST if for all runs
r, r′ ∈ R and m such that (r,m+1) ∼i (r
′, m+1), we have that Pi(r,m+1) = Pi(r
′, m+1) if
and only if Pi(r,m) = Pi(r
′, m). Intuitively, PERSIST (in the presence of synchrony, perfect
recall, and CONS) implies that the partition of points at time m + 1 is determined by the
partition of corresponding points at time m and the knowledge relation at time m+ 1.
Proposition 33 If I is a synchronous system that satisfies perfect recall and either PRIOR
and UNIF, or SDP, then I satisfies PERSIST.
PROOF. Straightforward; left to the reader. ✷
It is not clear to us at this stage whether PERSIST forces new properties in our language.
However, if we assume that PERSIST holds, we can get a result analogous to Theorem 32.
Theorem 34 Let A be a subset of {QUAL,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} and let I
be a coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and A. Then
there is a synchronous system I ′ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping
f : R 7→ R′ such that for all temporally linear formulas φ ∈ LKCT , (I, r,m) |= φ if and only
if (I ′, f(r), m) |= φ.
PROOF. See Appendix A.5. ✷
Thus, the question of whether PRIOR forces new properties in the presence of UNIF re-
duces to the question of whether PERSIST forces new properties. Finally, since SDP implies
PERSIST, PRIOR does not force new properties in the presence of SDP.
Our discussion of conditioning and priors up to now assumed synchrony and perfect recall.
Can we make sense of conditioning when we relax these assumptions? Note that the definition
of PRIOR does not rely on perfect recall. PRIOR is well defined even in systems where
agents can forget. However, in such systems, the intuitions that motivated the use of PRIOR
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are no longer valid. In particular, PRIOR does not imply coherence and the analogue to
Proposition 22 does not hold: we no longer can construct Pi(r,m + 1) from Pi(r,m) since
runs that are considered impossible at time m might be considered possible at time m+1. 16
Dropping the assumption of synchrony also leads to problems, even in the presence of perfect
recall. In an asynchronous setting, an agent might consider several points on the same run
possible. The question then arises as to how (or whether) we should distribute the plausibility
of a run over these points. Two approaches are considered in a probabilistic setting in [PR97],
in the context of analyzing games with imperfect recall. It would be of interest to see to what
extent these approaches can be carried over to the plausibilistic setting.
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a framework for belief dynamics that combines knowledge, time, and
plausibility (and hence beliefs), and investigated a number of properties of the framework,
such as complete axiomatizations for various sublanguages and various properties of the
relationships between the modal operators. Of course, the obvious question is why we should
consider this framework at all.
There are two features that distinguish our approach from others. The first is that we use
plausibility to model uncertainty, rather than other approaches that have been mentioned in
the literature, such as preference orderings on worlds or ǫ-semantics. The second is that we
include knowledge and time, as well as belief, explicitly in the framework.
We could have easily modified the framework to use other ways of modeling uncertainty.
Indeed, in a preliminary version of this paper [FH94c], we used preference orderings. We have
chosen to use plausibility measures for several reasons. First, plausibility measures generalize
all approaches to representing uncertainty that we are aware of. The use of plausibility makes
it easier to compare our approach, not only to preference-based approaches (e.g., [Bou92]),
but also to approaches based on κ-rankings (e.g., [GP92]), probably measures (e.g., [HT93]),
or any other measure of uncertainty. More importantly, it makes it easier for us to incorporate
intuitions from other approaches. We have already seen one example of this phenomenon
in the present paper: we defined a plausibilistic analogue of conditioning, and used it to
model minimal change. As we show in [FH97a], we can represent the standard approaches to
minimal change—belief revision and belief update—in terms of conditioning. Moreover, the
semantic characterization of conditioning should allow us to apply it more easily to deal with
complications that arise when the language lets us reason about multiple agents, actions,
and beliefs about beliefs. Another example of adopting probabilistic intuitions is given in
[Fri97,FH95,FH96b], where plausibilistic analogues of independence and Markov chains are
described and used to define a novel approach to belief change. We believe that these notions
will have applications elsewhere as well. Finally, plausibility measures have the advantage of
16We could, of course, redefine PRIOR so as to guarantee that Proposition 22 holds, but this leads
to other complications.
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greater expressive power than other approaches. For example, work on defaults has mainly
focused on properties of structures with a finite number of worlds. In our framework, however,
even a simple system with two global states might have an uncountable number of runs.
As shown in [FHK96], once we examine structures with infinitely many worlds, qualitative
plausibility measures can capture natural ordering of events that cannot be captured by
preference orderings, possibility measures, or κ-rankings.
As we have tried to argue throughout the paper, the explicit representation of knowledge and
time makes it much easier to study belief dynamics. Most current work in the area examines
only the beliefs of an agent and how they change after incorporating a new belief. Many
simplifying assumptions are made: that there is a single agent, that the agent’s knowledge
does not change, that new information can be characterized in the language, and so on.
It is useful to study this simple setting in order to get at the basic issues of belief change.
However, these simplifying assumptions are not suitable when we want examine belief change
in more realistic settings (such as the diagnosis example of Section 3.2). This means that
most of the results in the current belief change literature are not directly applicable in many
standard AI problems. Our framework dispenses with most of the simplifying assumptions
made in the literature, and thus can be viewed as a first step towards providing a model of
more realistic settings of belief change.
We have focused here on the foundations of the framework. In the future, we hope to apply
the framework to examine more realistic problems. We have already begun to do this. For
example, in [FH94c] we provide a detailed analysis of iterated prisoner dilemma games be-
tween two agents. It is well-known that the players cannot cooperate when they have common
knowledge of rationality. However, we show that they can cooperate when they have com-
mon belief of rationality. A recent proposal by van der Meyden [Mey94] for multi-agent belief
change can easily be embedded in our framework [van94]. We hope to use our framework to
study some of the problems considered by van der Meyden, such as speech-act semantics.
Another natural application area is reasoning about actions and planning in the presence of
uncertainty. We believe that the flexibility and expressive power of the framework will help
to clarify what is going on in all these areas.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 2.7
Theorem 7: K (resp., K45, KD45) is a sound and complete axiomatization for LB with
respect to M (resp., MCONS, MCONS,NORM).
PROOF. As usual, soundness is straightforward, so we focus on completeness. We prove
completeness by showing that for M ∈MK (resp.M
et
K ,M
est
K ) there is a structure M
+ ∈M
(resp. MCONS, MCONS,NORM) such that for all φ ∈ LB, we have (M,w) |= φ if and only if
(M+, w) |= φ. Completeness then follows from Theorem 1.
Let M = (W,π,B1, . . . ,Bn) be a Kripke structure for belief. We construct a Kripke struc-
ture for knowledge and plausibility M+ = (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn,P1, . . . ,Pn) as follows. We
set Ki(w) to be the set of worlds where agent i’s beliefs are the same as in w. Formally,
(w, v) ∈ Ki if Bi(w) = Bi(v). It is easy to verify that Ki is an equivalence relation. We define
Pi(w) = (W(w,i),Pl(w,i)), where W(w,i) = Bi(w) is the set of worlds agent i considers possible,
Pl(w,i)(∅) = 0, and Pl(w,i)(A) is 1 if A ⊆ W(w,i) is not empty It is easy to verify that these
(trivial) plausibility measures are qualitative.
We now prove that (M,w) |= φ if and only (M+, w) |= φ for any φ ∈ LB. This is shown
by induction on the structure of φ. The only interesting case is if φ is of the form Biφ
′.
Assume (M,w) |= Biφ
′. We want to show that (M+, w) |= Ki(true →i φ
′). We start by
noting that (w, v) ∈ Ki if and only if Bi(v) = Bi(w). This implies that Pi(v) = Pi(w). Thus,
(M+, v) |= true →i φ
′ if and only if (M+, w) |= true →i φ
′. Thus, it suffices to show that
(M+, w) |= true →i φ
′, since this implies that (M+, w) |= Ki(true →i φ
′), i.e., (M+, w) |=
Biφ
′. There are two cases. If Bi(w) = ∅, then W(w,i) = ∅. This implies that true →i φ
′
holds vacuously. If Bi(w) is not empty, then using the induction hypothesis we conclude that
[[φ′]](w,i) = Bi(w). From the definition of Pl(w,i) we conclude that Pl(w,i)([[φ
′]](w,i)) = 1 and that
Pl(w,i)([[¬φ
′]](w,i)) = 0. Thus, (M
+, w) |= true →i φ
′ and hence (M+, w) |= Ki(true →i φ
′).
Now assume (M,w) |= ¬Biφ
′. Then there is some v ∈ Bi(w) such that (M, v) |= ¬φ
′.
Using the induction hypothesis we conclude that Pl(w,i)([[¬φ
′]](w,i)) = 1. Hence, (M
+, w) |=
¬(true→i φ
′) and therefore, (M+, w) |= ¬Ki(true→i φ
′).
It remains to show that if M ∈ MetK then M
+ satisfies CONS, and if M ∈ MestK , then M
+
also satisfies NORM. Assume Bi is transitive and Euclidean. Let w and v be worlds such
that (w, v) ∈ Bi. We claim that Bi(w) = Bi(v). If (w, t) ∈ Bi, then since Bi is Euclidean we
get that (v, t) ∈ Bi. If (v, t) ∈ Bi, then since Bi is transitive we get that (w, t) ∈ Bi. Thus,
Bi(v) = Bi(w), as desired. Recall that if Bi(v) = Bi(w), then our construction ensures that
v ∈ Ki(w). Hence, Bi(w) ⊆ Ki(w) and M
+ satisfies CONS. Assume that Bi is serial. This
implies that for all w, Bi(w) is not empty. Thus, our construction guarantees that W(w,i) is
not empty and Pl(w,i)(W(w,i)) >⊥. ✷
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Theorem 8: AXKB (resp., AXKB,CONS, AXKB,CONS,NORM) is a sound and complete axiom-
atization of LKB with respect to M (resp., MCONS, MCONS,NORM).
PROOF. Again soundness is straightforward, so we focus on completeness. We sketch a
completeness proof following the usual Makinson [Mak66] style of proof. We describe only
the parts that are different from the standard proofs. See, for example, Halpern and Moses
[HM92] for details.
In order to prove completeness, we need only show that if the formula φ is consistent with the
axiom system (i.e., AXKB,AXKB,CONS or AXKB,CONS,NORM) then φ is satisfiable in a Kripke
structure of the appropriate class (i.e., M, MCONS, or MCONS,NORM, respectively).
Let V be a set of formulas and AX an axiom system. We say that V is AX-consistent if for
all φ1, . . . φn ∈ V , it is not the case that AX ⊢ ¬(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn). The set V is a maximal
consistent set if it is consistent, and for each formula φ, either φ ∈ V or ¬φ ∈ V .
We now build a canonical model MKB for AXKB, in which every AXKB-consistent formula is
satisfiable. MKB has a world wV corresponding to every maximal AX
KB-consistent set V of
formulas; we show that (MKB, wV ) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V .
We proceed as follows. If V is a set of formulas, define V/Ki = {φ : Kiφ ∈ V } and V/Bi =
{φ : Biφ ∈ V }. Let M
KB = (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn,Pi, . . . ,Pn), where
• W = {wV : V is a maximal AX
KB-consistent set of formulas}
• π(wV )(p) = true if and only if p ∈ V
• Ki = {(wV , wU) : V/Ki ⊆ U}
• Pi(wV ) = (W(wV ,i),Pl(wV ,i)), where W(wV ,i) = {wU : V/Bi ⊆ U}, Pl(wV ,i)(∅) = 0, and
Pl(wV ,i)(A) = 1 for A 6= ∅.
Using standard arguments, it is easy to show that the Ki’s are equivalence relations (see
[HM92]). Using a standard induction argument, we can verify that (MKB, wV ) |= φ if and
only if φ ∈ V .
This construction proves completeness for AXKB. To prove completeness for the other two
variants we use the same construction, setting W to correspond to the maximal AXKB,CONS-
consistent sets (resp. AXKB,CONS,NORM-consistent sets). We must show that the resulting
canonical models satisfy CONS and NORM, respectively.
Let MKB,CONS be the canonical model constructed for AXKB,CONS. To show that MKB,CONS
satisfies CONS, it is enough to show that V/Ki ⊆ V/Bi. To show this, assume φ ∈ V/Ki.
Then Kiφ ∈ V . Since KB2 ∈ AX
KB,CONS, we conclude that Biφ ∈ V , and thus φ ∈ V/Bi.
Let MKB,CONS,NORM be the canonical model constructed for AXKB,CONS,NORM. The argu-
ment above shows that MKB,CONS,NORM satisfies CONS. To show that it satisfies NORM,
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i.e., Pl(w,i)(W(w,i)) >⊥, it is enough to show that V/Bi is consistent, for then there must
be some U such that V/Bi ∈ U . Assume, by way of contradiction, that V/Bi is incon-
sistent. Then there are formulas φ1, . . . , φm ∈ V/Bi such that ⊢ ¬(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φm). Since
φ1, . . . , φn ∈ V/Bi, we conclude that Biφ1, . . . , Biφm ∈ V . Using the K45 axioms for Bi,
standard arguments show that Bi(φ1, . . . , φn) ∈ V , and hence that Bi(false) ∈ V , which
contradicts the consistency of V . ✷
Lemma 10: Let M be a propositional Kripke structure of knowledge and plausibility satis-
fying CONS and SDP. Suppose that w, i, and α are such that the most plausible worlds in
Pi(w) are exactly those worlds in Ki(w) that satisfy α, i.e., MP(Pi(w)) = {w
′ ∈ Ki(w) :
(M,w′) |= α}. Then for any formula φ ∈ LKB that includes only the modalities Ki and Bi,
(M,w) |= φ if and only if (M,w) |= φ∗, where φ∗ is the result of recursively replacing each
subformula of the form Biψ in φ by Ki(α⇒ ψ
∗).
PROOF. We prove by induction that for any w′ ∈ Ki(w), (M,w
′) |= φ if and only if
(M,w′) |= φ∗. The only interesting case is if φ has the from Biφ
′. Suppose that (M,w′) |=
Biφ
′. This implies that (M,w′) |= true →i φ
′, i.e., for all w′′ ∈ MP(Pi(w
′)) we have
(M,w′′) |= φ′. Now let w′′ ∈ Ki(w
′). If (M,w′′) |= ¬α, then (M,w′′) |= α ⇒ (φ′)∗. If
(M,w′′) |= α then, by definition, w′′ ∈ MP(Pi(w)), and since we assumed SDP, MP(Pi(w
′)) =
MP(Pi(w)). Thus, we conclude that (M,w
′′) |= φ′, and using the induction hypothesis we
get that (M,w′′) |= (φ′)∗. We conclude that all worlds in Ki(w
′) satisfy α⇒ (φ′)∗, and thus
(M,w′) |= Ki(α ⇒ (φ
′)∗). Now assume that (M,w′) |= Ki(α ⇒ (φ
′)∗). Let w′′ be any world
in Ki(w
′). Since we assumed SDP, we have that MP(Pi(w
′′)) = MP(Pi(w)) is the set of
worlds in Ki(w) that satisfy α. We conclude, using our induction hypothesis, that all worlds
in MP(Pi(w
′′)) satisfy φ′. Hence, (M,w′′) |= true→i φ
′. Since this is true for all w′′ ∈ Ki(w
′)
we conclude that (M,w′) |= Biφ
′. ✷
A.2 Proofs for Section 2.8
Theorem 11: AX is a sound and complete axiomatization for LKC with respect to M.
PROOF. Again, we just describe the completeness proof. This proof draws on the usual
completeness proofs for S5 modal logic, and the completeness proof for conditional logic
described in [Fri97,FH97b].
We proceed as follows. If V is a set of formulas, define V/Ki = {φ : Kiφ ∈ V } and V/Ni =
{φ : Niφ ∈ V }. We define a canonical model M
c = (W,π,K1, . . . ,Kn,Pi, . . . ,Pn) as follows:
• W = {wV : V is a maximal AX-consistent set of formulas}
• π(wV )(p) = true if and only if p ∈ V
• Ki = {(wV , wU) : V/Ki ⊆ U}
46
• Pi(wV ) = (W(wV ,i),F(wV ,i),Pl(wV ,i)), where
· W(wV ,i) = {wU : V/Ni ⊆ U},
· F(wV ,i) = {[φ](wV ,i) : φ ∈ L
KC} where [φ](wV ,i) = {wU ∈ W(wV ,i) : φ ∈ U}, and
· Pl(wV ,i) is such that Pl(wV ,i)([φ](wV ,i)) ≤ Pl(wV ,i)([ψ](wV ,i)) if and only if (φ∨ψ)→i ψ ∈ V .
We need to verify thatM c is indeed a structure inM. Using standard arguments it is easy to
show that the Ki relations are equivalence relations. In [Fri97,FH97b] we prove that Pi(wV )
is a well-defined qualitative plausibility space.
Finally, we have to show that (M c, wV ) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V . As usual, this is done by
induction on the structure of φ. We use the standard argument for formulas of the form Kiφ
and arguments from [Fri97,FH97b] for formulas of the from φ →i ψ. We omit the details
here. ✷
Theorem 12: Let A be a subset of {RANK,NORM,REF,UNIF,CONS, SDP} and let A
be the corresponding subset of {C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10}. Then AX ∪ A is a sound and
complete axiomatization with respect to the structures in M satisfying A.
PROOF. Yet again, we focus on completeness. We obtain completeness in each case by
modifying the proof of Theorem 11. We construct a canonical model as in that proof, checking
consistency with the extended axiom system. The resulting structure is in M and has the
property that (M,wV ) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V . We just need to show that this structure
also satisfies the corresponding semantic restrictions.
First, we consider CONS and axiom C9. Assume that C9 is included as an axiom. It is
easy to see that this implies that V/Ni ⊆ V/Ki. This implies that W(wV ,i) ⊆ Ki(wV ) in our
construction.
Now consider the relationship between SDP and C10. Assume that C10 is included as an
axiom. We need to show that if wU ∈ Ki(wV ), then Pi(wU) = Pi(wV ). It is enough to show
that φ →i ψ ∈ V if and only if φ →i ψ ∈ U , since these statements determine Pi in our
construction. Assume φ →i ψ ∈ V . Then, according to C10, Ki(φ →i ψ) ∈ V , and thus
φ→i ψ ∈ V/Ki. Recall that wU ∈ Ki(wV ) only if V/Ki ⊆ U . We conclude that φ→i ψ ∈ U .
The other direction follows from the fact that Ki is symmetric in our construction, and thus
wV ∈ Ki(wU).
The desired relationship between RANK, NORM, REF, and UNIF and the axioms C5,
C6, C7, and C8 is proved in [Fri97,FH97b], for a logic that does not mention knowledge.
Since these conditions put restrictions on Pi(w) and do not involve knowledge, the proof of
[Fri97,FH97b] goes through unchanged; we do not repeat it here. ✷
Theorem 13: Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. The formula
φ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable in a Kripke
structure with at most 2|Sub(φ)| worlds.
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PROOF. The proof of this theorem relies on techniques from [FH96a]. We sketch only the
main steps here. The proof is based on a standard filtration argument.
Suppose there is a structure M and a world w in M such that (M,w) |= φ. Let Sub+(φ) =
Sub(φ) ∪ {¬φ : φ ∈ Sub(φ)}. We say that V ⊆ Sub+(φ) is an atom if for each φ ∈ Sub(φ),
either φ ∈ V or ¬φ ∈ V . We say that a world w in M satisfies an atom V if for all φ ∈ V ,
we have (M,w) |= φ. It is easy to see that each world satisfies exactly one atom. Given
a world w′, we define [w] to be the equivalence class containing all worlds that satisfy the
same atom as w. For each equivalence class [w], we arbitrarily choose a representative world
w[w] ∈ [w]. We define M
′ = (W ′, π′,K′1, . . .K
′
n,P
′
1, . . . ,P
′
n), where W
′ = {[w] : w ∈ W},
π′([w]) = π(w[w]), K
′
i = {([w], [w
′]) : (w,w′) ∈ Ki}, and P
′
i([w]) = (W
′
([w],i),Pl
′
([w],i)), where
W ′([w],i) = {[w
′] : w′ ∈ W(w[w],i)} and Pl
′
([w],i)(A) ≤ Pl
′
([w],i)(B) if Pl(w[w],i)(A
∗ ∩ W(w[w],i)) ≤
Pl(w[w],i)(B
∗ ∩ W(w[w],i)), where A
∗ = {w′′ : ∃[w′] ∈ A,w′′ ∈ [w′]}. Arguments essentially
identical to those of [FH96a] show that (M ′, [w]) |= ψ if and only if (M,w) |= ψ for all
ψ ∈ Sub(φ); we omit details here.
We now have to describe how to modify this argument to ensure that M ′ satisfies A. The
modifications for NORM,REF,UNIF and RANK are described in [FH96a]. Suppose that M
satisfies CONS. Let [w′] ∈ W ′([w],i). By definition, w
′ ∈ W(w[w],i). But since M satisfies CONS,
we have that w′ ∈ Ki(w[w]). By definition, we get that [w
′] ∈ K′i([w]). We conclude that M
′
satisfies CONS. Finally, suppose thatM satisfies SDP. We forceM ′ to satisfy SDP as follows.
For all worlds w, we choose a representative world wKi([w]) ∈ K
′
i([w]) such that if (w,w
′) ∈ Ki,
then wKi([w]) = wKi([w′]). We then modify the construction so that, for each world v ∈ Ki(w),
we have P ′i([v]) = P
′
i(wKi([w])). It is easy to see that for all ψ →i χ ∈ Sub(φ), we have that
(M,w) |= ψ →i χ if and only if (M,wKi([w])) |= ψ →i χ. Thus, it is easy to show that
after this modification we still have that (M ′, [w]) |= ψ if and only if (M,w) |= ψ for all
ψ ∈ Sub(φ). ✷
Theorem 15: Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} containing
CONS and either SDP or UNIF. If φ talks about the knowledge and plausibility of only one
agent, then φ is satisfiable in a Kripke structure satisfying A if and only if it is satisfiable
in a preferential Kripke structure satisfying A with at most |Sub(φ)|3 worlds.
PROOF. Assume M = (W,π,K1,P1) is a structure satisfying φ. Since CONS is in A, we
must have that W(w,1) ⊆ K1(w)). Without loss of generality, we can assume that K1 consists
of one equivalence class, that is, that K1 =W ×W . Since CONS and SDP imply UNIF, and
since A contains CONS and either SDP or UNIF, we conclude that M satisfies UNIF. Using
techniques from [FH96a] we can assume, without loss of generality, that for each world w,
the plausibility space P1(w) is preferential (i.e., induced by some preference ordering) and
that W(w,1) has at most |Sub(φ)|
2 worlds.
Choose w0 ∈ W such that (M,w0) |= φ. For each formula ¬K1ψ ∈ Sub(φ) such that
(M,w0) |= ¬K1ψ, we select a world wψ such that (M,wψ) |= ¬ψ. Let T be {w0} ∪
{wψ : ¬K1ψ ∈ Sub(φ)}. Note that the cardinality of T is at most |Sub(φ)|. Define M
′ =
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(W ′, π′,K′1,P
′
1) by taking W
′ to be the union of W ′(w,1) for each w ∈ T , taking π
′ to be π
restricted toW ′, and taking P ′1(w) = P1(w). Clearly |W
′| is at most |Sub(φ)|3. A straightfor-
ward argument for all subformulas ψ of φ and all worlds w′ ∈ W ′, we have (M,w′) |= ψ if and
only if (M ′, w′) |= ψ. It follows that (M ′, w0) |= φ, so φ is satisfiable in a small preferential
structure. ✷
Theorem 16: Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK}. If CONS ∈
A, but it is not the case that UNIF or SDP is in A, then the validity problem with respect
to structures satisfying A is complete for exponential time. Otherwise, the validity problem
is complete for polynomial space.
PROOF. The proof combines ideas from [FH94a,FH96a,HM92]. We briefly sketch the main
ideas here, referring the reader to the other papers for details.
The polynomial space lower bound follows from the polynomial space lower bound for logics
of knowledge alone [HM92]. For the exponential lower bound we use exactly the lower bound
described Fagin and Halpern [FH94a] for the combination of knowledge and probability
(which is in turn based on the lower bound for PDL [FL79]). This lower bound construction
uses only formulas involving Ki and probabilistic statements of the form wi(φ) = 1 (i.e., the
probability of φ is 1). Since Niφ has exactly the same properties as wi(φ) = 1, the same
construction applies to our logic.
In the cases where we claim a polynomial space upper bound, this is shown by proving
that if a formula φ is satisfiable at all, it is satisfiable in a structure that looks like a tree,
with polynomial branching and depth no greater than the depth of nesting of Ki and →i
operators in φ. The result now follows along similar lines to corresponding results for logics
of knowledge.
Finally, the exponential time upper bound follows by showing that if a formulas is satisfiable
at all, it is satisfiable in an exponential size structure that can be constructed in deterministic
exponential time; the technique is similar to that used to show that logics of knowledge with
common knowledge are decidable in deterministic exponential time [HM92] or that PDL is
decidable in deterministic exponential time [Pra79]. ✷
Theorem 17: Let A be a subset of {CONS,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} containing
CONS and either UNIF or SDP. For the case of one agent, the validity problem in structures
satisfying A is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. We show that the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. It follows that the validity
problem is co-NP-complete. The lower bound is immediate, since clearly the logic is at least
as hard as propositional logic. For the upper bound, by Theorem 15, φ is satisfiable in a
structure satisfying A if and only if φ is satisfiable in a structure M of size polynomial in
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|φ|. We simply guess a structure M and check that φ is satisfiable. It is easy to show that
model checking can be done in polynomial time (see [HM92,FH96a]). ✷
A.3 Proofs for Section 3.3
Theorem 20: The axiom system AXT is a sound and complete axiomatization of LKCT
with respect to C.
PROOF. As usual, we focus on completeness. Again, we construct a canonical interpreted
system I such that if φ ∈ LKCT is consistent, then φ is satisfied in I. The outline of the
proof is similar to that of Theorem 11.
We proceed as follows. Let V be a maximal AXT -consistent set of formulas in LKCT . We
define V/© = {φ : ©φ ∈ V }. We claim that V/© is also a maximal AXT -consistent set.
To show that V/© is maximal, assume that φ 6∈ V/©. Then ©φ 6∈ V . From axiom T2,
we have that ©¬φ ∈ V , and thus, ¬φ ∈ V/©. This shows that V/© is maximal. To show
that V/© is AXT -consistent, assume that there are formulas φ1, . . . φn ∈ V/© such that
⊢AXT ¬(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn). From K1, T1 and RT1 we get that false ∈ V/©. Thus, ©false ∈ V .
Using T2 we get that ¬©true ∈ V . Using RT1, however, we get that ©true ∈ V , which
contradicts the assumption that V is consistent. Thus, V/© is AXT -consistent. Finally, we
define V/©m to the result of m applications of /©. Repeated applications of the above
argument show that V/©m is a maximal AXT -consistent set for all m ≥ 0.
We construct a canonical interpreted system as follows. Let I = (R, π,P1, . . . ,Pn), where
• R = {rV : V ⊆ LKCT is a maximal AXT -consistent set} such that
· rVe (m) = V/©
m, and
· rVi (m) = (V/©
m)/Ki,
• π(rV , m)(p) = true if and only if p ∈ rVe (m), and
• Pi(r
V , m) = (W(rV ,m,i),Pl(rV ,m,i)), where
· W(rV ,m,i) = {(r
U , n) : (V/©m)/Ni ⊆ U/©
n }, and
· Pl(rV ,m,i) is such that Pl(rV ,m,i)([φ](rV ,m,i)) ≤ Pl(rV ,m,i)([ψ](rV ,m,i)) if and only if (φ∨ψ)→i
ψ ∈ V/©m, where [φ](rV ,m,i) = {(r
U , k) ∈ W(rV ,m,i) : φ ∈ U/©
k}.
Using the arguments in the completeness proof for conditional logic of [Fri97,FH97b], we
can show that Pi(r,m) is well-defined for all i. Finally, we have to show that (I, r
V , m) |= φ
if and only if φ ∈ rVe (m). As usual, this is done by induction on the structure of φ. This
is identical to the proof in of Theorem 11 except for the © modality, which is handled by
standard arguments. We omit the details here. ✷
Theorem 21: Let A be a subset of {RANK,NORM,REF,UNIF,CONS, SDP} and let A
be the corresponding subset of {C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10}. Then AXT ∪ A is a sound and
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complete axiomatization with respect to systems in C satisfying A.
PROOF. Again, we focus on completeness. We obtain completeness in each case by modi-
fying the proof of Theorem 20. We construct a canonical system as in that proof, checking
consistency with the extended axiom system. The resulting system has the property that
(I, rV , m) |= φ if and only if φ ∈ V/©m. We just need to show that this system satisfies
the corresponding semantic restrictions. The desired relationship between these semantic
properties and axioms is proved in [Fri97,FH97b] and the proof of Theorem 12. ✷
A.4 Proofs for Section 4.1
Proposition 25: Let I be a synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and PRIOR. If φ
characterizes agent i’s knowledge at (r,m+ 1) with respect to his knowledge at (r,m), then
(I, r,m+ 1) |= ψ →i ξ if and only if (I, r,m) |= ©(φ ∧ ψ)→i ©ξ.
PROOF. Expanding the definition we get thatR([[©(φ∧ψ)]](r,m)) = {r
′ ∈ W(r,i) : (r
′, m) ∼i
(r,m), (r′, m+1) |= φ∧ψ}. Similarly, we get that R([[ψ]](r,m+1)) = {r
′ ∈ W(r,i) : (r
′, m+1) ∼i
(r,m+1), (r′, m+1) |= ψ}. However, since φ characterizes agent i’s knowledge at time m+1
with respect to his knowledge at time m, we get that (r′, m+ 1) ∼i (r,m+ 1) if and only if
(r′, m) ∼i (r,m) and (r,m+ 1) |= φ. We conclude that R([[©(φ ∧ ψ)]](r,m)) = R([[ψ]](r,m+1)).
The lemma now follows directly from Proposition 22. ✷
Lemma 28: Let I be a synchronous static system satisfying PRIOR, RANK, SDP, and
perfect recall that has finite branching. Then (I, r,m) |= Biφ ≡ Bi©Biφ for all propositional
formulas φ.
PROOF. For all points (r,m) in I, note thatW(r,m,i) = ∪{Aψ}, where Aψ is the set of points
(r′, m) ∼i (r,m) such that the agent’s new knowledge at time m + 1 is ψ. If I has finite
branching, this is a finite partition of W(r,m,i). Additionally, note that if Pl(r,m,i) is a ranking,
and C1, . . . , Ck is a finite partition of C, then since Pl(r,m,i)(C) = max1≤j≤k Pl(r,m,i)(Cj), there
must be some j such that Pl(r,m,i)(Cj) = Pl(r,m,i)(C). In particular, for all C ⊆W(r,m,i), either
Pl(r,m,i)(C) = ⊤ or Pl(r,m,i)(W(r,m,i) − C) = ⊤.
For the “⇒” part, suppose that (I, r,m) |= Biφ. If Pl(r,m,i)(W(r,m,i)) = ⊥, then (I, r,m) |=
Bi©Biφ vacuously. If Pl(r,m,i)(W(r,m,i)) 6= ⊥, then Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)([[¬φ]](r,m,i)).
Assume that ψ is such that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) = ⊤. It is easy to verify that since Pl(r,m,i) is a rank-
ing, we get that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ ∩ [[φ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ ∩ [[¬φ]](r,m,i)). Let r
′ be a run such that
(r′, m) ∈ Aψ. By SDP, we get that Pl(r,m,i) = Pl(r′,m,i), and thus Pl(r′,m,i)(Aψ ∩ [[φ]](r′,m,i)) >
Pl(r′,m,i)(Aψ ∩ [[¬φ]](r′,m,i)). By definition of Aψ, we have that (r
′′, m + 1) ∼i (r
′, m + 1) if
and only if (r′′, m) ∈ Aψ. Since I satisfies PRIOR, Pl(r′,m+1,i) is the result of conditioning
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Pl(r,m,i) on Aψ. Moreover, since propositions are static, we get that Pl(r′,m+1,i)([[φ]](r′,m+1,i)) >
Pl(r′,m+1,i)([[¬φ]](r′,m+1,i)). Thus, (I, r
′, m) |= ©Biφ. We conclude that Aψ ⊆ [[©Biφ]](r,m,i),
and thus Pl(r,m,i)([[©Biφ]](r,m,i)) = ⊤. Moreover, since Aψ ⊆ [[©Biφ]](r,m,i) for all Aψ such that
Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) = ⊤, we get that Pl(r,m,i)([[¬©Biφ]](r,m,i)) ≤ max{Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) : Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) <
⊤} < ⊤. We conclude that Pl(r,m,i)([[©Biφ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)([[¬©Biφ]](r,m,i)), and thus,
(I, r,m) |= Bi©Biφ.
For the “⇐” part, suppose that (I, r,m) |= Bi©Biφ. If Pl(r,m,i)(W(r,m,i)) = ⊥, then (I, r,m) |=
Biφ vacuously. If Pl(r,m,i)(W(r,m,i)) 6= ⊥, then Pl(r,m,i)([[©Biφ]](r,m,i)) >
Pl(r,m,i)([[¬©Biφ]](r,m,i)). Thus, since Pl(r,m,i) is a ranking, Pl(r,m,i)([[©Biφ]](r,m,i)) = ⊤. Let
(r′, m) be some point in Aψ for some ψ. By SDP, we have that (I, r
′, m) |= ©Bφ if and only
if (I, r′′, m) |= ©Bφ for all points (r′′, m) ∈ Aψ. Thus, [[©Biφ]](r,m,i) = Aψ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Aψk
for some ψ1, . . . , ψk. Since Pl(r,m,i)([[©Biφ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)([[¬©Biφ]](r,m,i)), we get that
Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) = ⊤ only if ψ = ψj for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Moreover, since Aψ1 , . . . , Aψk is a finite
partition of [[©Biφ]](r,m,i), there must be at least one 1 ≤ j ≤ k such that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψj ) = ⊤.
Let ψj be such that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψj ) = ⊤. Suppose that (r
′, m) ∈ Aψj . Then we have that
Pl(r′,m+1,i)([[φ]](r′,m+1,i)) > Pl(r′,m+1,i)([[¬φ]](r′,m+1,i)). Since I is synchronous, static, and sat-
isfies perfect recall, PRIOR, and SDP, we get that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψj ∩ [[φ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)(Aψj ∩
[[¬φ]](r,m,i)). Since Pl(r,m,i) is a ranking, we get that Pl(r,m,i)(Aψj ∩ [[φ]](r,m,i)) = ⊤, and thus,
Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) = ⊤. Finally, if Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ) < ⊤, then Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ∩[[¬φ]](r,m,i)) < ⊤. Thus,
since Pl(r,m,i)([[¬φ]](r,m,i)) = maxψ Pl(r,m,i)(Aψ ∩ [[¬φ]](r,m,i)), we get that Pl(r,m,i)([[¬φ]](r,m,i)) <
⊤. We conclude that (I, r,m) |= Biφ. ✷
A.5 Proofs for Section 4.2
Theorem 32: Let A be a subset of {QUAL,NORM,REF,RANK} and let I be a coherent
synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, and A. Then there is a synchronous
system I ′ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping f : R 7→ R′ such that for
all temporally linear formulas φ ∈ LKCT , we have (I, r,m) |= φ if and only if (I ′, f(r), m) |=
φ.
PROOF. To construct I ′, we use a general technique for taking a “sum” of a sequence
of plausibility spaces. Let λ be an ordinal and let {Si : 0 ≤ i < λ} be a sequence of
plausibility spaces, where Si = (Wi,Pli) and the Wi’s are pairwise disjoint. Define ⊕iSi as
(∪iWi,Pl⊕Si), where Pl⊕Si(A) ≥ Pl⊕Si(B) if either Pli(A ∩ Wi) = Pli(B ∩ Wi) = ⊥ for
all i, or there exists some i such that Pli(A ∩ Wi) ≥ Pli(B ∩ Wi), Pli(A ∩ Wi) >⊥, and
Plj(A ∩ Wj) = Plj(B ∩ Wj) = ⊥ for all j < i. We can think of ⊕iSi as a lexicographic
combination of the Si’s.
Lemma 35 (a) ⊕iSi is a plausibility space,
(b) if Si is qualitative for all i, then ⊕iSi is qualitative,
(c) if Si is ranked for all i, then ⊕iSi is ranked,
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(d) (⊕iSi)|C is isomorphic to ⊕i(Si|C) under the identity mapping.
(e) (⊕iSi)|Wj is isomorphic to Sj under the identity mapping.
(f) If W1, . . . ,Wk = ∅, then ⊕iSi is isomorphic to ⊕i≥k+1Si.
PROOF. We have to show that ≤ is reflexive, transitive, and satisfies A1. It is easy to see
that, by definition, ≤ is reflexive. Next, we consider transitivity. Suppose that Pl⊕Si(A) ≥
Pl⊕Si(B) and Pl⊕Si(B) ≥ Pl⊕Si(C). If Pli(B∩Wi) = ⊥i for all i, then clearly Pl(C∩Wi) = ⊥i
for all i (since Pl⊕Si(B) ≥ Pl⊕Si(C)), so Pl⊕Si(A) ≥ Pl⊕Si(C). So suppose that Pl(B∩Wi) >
⊥i for some i. Let i and j be the smallest indexes such that Pli(A ∩Wi) > ⊥i and Plj(B ∩
Wj) > ⊥j . It is easy to see that i ≤ j, and that Plk(C ∩Wk) = ⊥k for all k ≤ j. If i < j, we
conclude that Pli(A∩Wi) ≥ Pli(C ∩Wi) = ⊥i, and thus Pl⊕Si(A) ≥ Pl⊕Si(C). On the other
hand, if i = j, then by definition Pli(A∩Wi) ≥ Pli(B ∩Wi), and Pli(B ∩Wi) ≥ Pli(C ∩Wi).
Since ≤ is transitive in Si, we get that Pli(A ∩ Wi) ≥ Pli(C ∩ Wi). Thus, we conclude
that Pl⊕Si(A) ≥ Pl⊕Si(C), as desired. Finally, we consider A1. Suppose that A ⊆ B. Then
A∩Wi ⊆ B∩Wi for all i. Since each Si satisfies A1, we have that Pli(A∩Wi) ≤ Pli(C ∩Wi)
for all i. It easily follows that Pl⊕Si(A) ≤ Pl⊕Si(B).
Suppose that Si is qualitative for all i. We have to show that ⊕iSi is also qualitative. We
start by considering A2. Suppose that A,B, and C are pairwise disjoint sets such that
Pl⊕Si(A∪B) > Pl⊕Si(C) and Pl⊕Si(A ∪C) > Pl⊕Si(B). Let i and j be the minimal indexes
such that Pli((A ∪ B) ∩ Wi) > ⊥i and Plj((A ∪ C) ∩ Wj) > ⊥j . We claim that i = j.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that i < j. Then, Pli((A ∪ C) ∩ Wi) = ⊥i and hence
Pli(A ∩Wi) = ⊥i. Moreover, since Pl⊕Si(A ∪C) > Pl⊕Si(B), we get that Pli(B ∩Wi) = ⊥i.
Using A3 in Si, we conclude that Pli((A∪B)∩Wi) = ⊥i, which contradicts our assumption
that Pli((A ∪ B) ∩Wi) > ⊥i. Symmetric arguments show that we also cannot have j < i.
Thus, i = j. By definition Pli((A∪B)∩Wi) > Pli(C∩Wi) and Pli((A∪C)∩Wi) > Pli(B∩Wi).
Using A2 we conclude that Pli(A ∩Wi) > Pli((B ∪ C) ∩Wi). It is also easy to verify, using
A3, that Plj((B ∪ C) ∩Wj) = ⊥j for all j < i. Thus, we get that Pl⊕Si(A) > Pl⊕Si(B ∪ C),
as desired. Next, consider A3. The construction of ⊕Si is such that Pl⊕Si(A) =⊥ if and only
if Pl1(A ∩Wi) =⊥ for all i. It is easy to see that A3 follows from A3 in each Si.
Finally, part (c) follows immediately from the definition, part (d) follows immediately from
COND, part (e) is a special case of part (d), and part (f) follows immediately from the
definition. ✷
Returning to the proof of Theorem 32, first suppose that REF is not in A. Let I =
(R, π,P1, . . . ,Pn) be a coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall and CONS.
Roughly speaking, the proof goes as follows. We construct a system I ′ which consists of
countably many copies of R. The runs in Rm, the mth copy of R, are used to simulate the
agent’s plausibility assessment at time m. More precisely, for all times m, we define a prior
on Rm that corresponds to the agent’s plausibility measure at time m in I. These priors
are then combined using ⊕ to construct the agent’s prior in I ′. Since ⊕ orders the priors
lexicographically, if m < m′, the priors on Rm dominate those on Rm
′
. The construction
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guarantees that at time m, the agent considers possible only runs in Rm ∪Rm+1 ∪ . . .. Since
the prior on Rm dominates the rest, the agent’s plausibility measure at time m is similar
to that at time m in I. This similarity is what guarantees that conditional formulas are
evaluated in the same way in I and I ′. This “peeling away” of copies of R ensures that all
temporally linear formulas holding in runs in I are also satisfied in the corresponding runs
in I ′.
The formal construction proceeds as follows. Let R ⊆ R and l ∈ IN∗ (recall that IN∗ =
IN ∪ {∞}). Define Rl = {rl : r ∈ R}, where, for each i ∈ {e, 1 . . . , n}, we have
rli(m) =


〈ri(m), m〉 if l ≥ m
〈ri(l), m〉 if l < m.
Let I ′ = (R′, π′,P ′1, . . . ,P
′
n), where R
′ = ∪l∈IN∗R
l, π′ is defined so that if m ≤ l then
π′(rl, m) = π(r,m) and if m > l then π(rl, m) = π(r, l), and P ′i is defined by the priors
described below.
To define a prior on R′, we first define a plausibility space Pm(r,i) on R
m for each m ∈ IN , run
r ∈ R, and agent i. We want the time m projection of Pm(r,i) to be isomorphic to Pi(r,m).
To achieve this, we define Pm(r,i) = (R
m
(r,i),Pl
m
(r,i)), where R
m
(r,i) = R(W(r,m,i))
m and Plm(r,i) is
defined so that for A ⊆ W(r,m,i), we have Pl
m
(r,i)((R(A))
m) = Pl(r,m,i)(A). For l ∈ IN
∗, we
define the prior of agent i at run rl to be the combination of these priors for all time points:
P ′(rl,i) = ⊕mP
m
(r,i).
It is easy to see that I ′ is synchronous. It is also easy to check that I ′ satisfies perfect recall:
From the definition, we have that
K′i(r
l, m) =


{(r′l
′
, m) : (r′, m) ∈ Ki(r,m), l
′ ≥ m} if l ≥ m
{(r′l, m) : (r′, l) ∈ Ki(r, l)} if l < m.
Moreover, since I satisfies perfect recall, we have that R(Ki(r,m + 1)) ⊆ R(Ki(r,m)). We
conclude that R′(K′i(r
l, m + 1)) ⊆ R′(K′i(r
l, m)), which is just what we need for perfect
recall.
Let φ ∈ LKC (so that φ does not include any temporal modalities) and l ≥ m. We show
that (I ′, rl, m) |= φ if and only if (I, r,m) |= φ. As usual we prove this by induction on the
structure of φ. The only interesting cases are these that directly involve modalities.
We start with the Ki modality. Suppose that (I, r,m) |= Kiφ. Then for all points (s,m) ∈
Ki(r,m), we have (I, s,m) |= φ. Let (s
k, m) ∈ K′i(r
l, m). From the definition of I ′ we get that
(s,m) ∈ Ki(r,m) and k ≥ m. Using the induction hypothesis, we get that (I
′, sk, m) |= φ.
We conclude that (I ′, rl, m) |= Kiφ. Now suppose that (I, r,m) 6|= Kiφ. Then there is a point
(s,m) ∈ Ki(r,m) such that (I, s,m) |= ¬φ. Using the induction hypothesis we conclude that
(I, sm, m) |= ¬φ. Since (sm, m) ∈ K′i(r
l, m), we conclude that (I ′, rl, m) 6|= Kiφ.
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We now turn to the →i modality. The definition of PRIOR implies that P
′
i(r
l, m) is the
projection of P ′(rl,i) conditioned on R
′(K′i(r
l, m)). Now P ′(rl,i) = ⊕mPl
m
(r,i). Parts (d) and
(f) of Lemma 35 imply that P ′(rl,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)) is isomorphic to ⊕k≥m(P
k
(r,i))|R′(K′i(rl,m))). Con-
sider the first term in the “sum”, Pm(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)). Since I satisfies CONS, we have that
W(r,m,i) ⊆ Ki(r,m). Thus, conditioning on R
′(K ′i(r
l, m)) does not remove any runs from
Rm(r,i) = (R(W(r,m,i))
m. It follows that Pm(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)) = P
m
(r,i) which is isomorphic to Pi(r,m)
under the mapping r′m 7→ (r′, m). Finally, since Pm(r,i) is the first plausibility space in the
“sum”, it determines the ordering of all pairs of sets, unless both of them are assigned plau-
sibility ⊥ by Plm(r,i). Putting all this together, we conclude that if A
′, B′ ⊆ W ′(rl,m,i) and
A,B ⊆ W(r,m,i) such that (R(A))
m = R′(A′) ∩ Rm and (R(B))m = R′(B′) ∩ Rm, and if
Pl(r,m,i)(A) > ⊥, then Pl
′
(rl,m,i)(A
′) ≥ Pl′(rl,m,i)(B
′) if and only if Pl(r,m,i)(A) ≥ Pl(r,m,i)(B).
Assume that (I, r,m) |= φ →i ψ. Thus, either Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) = ⊥ or Pl(r,m,i)([[φ ∧
ψ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)([[φ∧¬ψ]](r,m,i)). If Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) = ⊥, then from the coherence of I it
follows that if A ⊆W(r,l′,i) and R(A) ⊆ R([[φ]](r,m,i)), then Pl(r,l′,i)(A) = ⊥. This implies that
Pll
′
(r,i)((R([[φ]](r,m,i))
l′ ∩ R(W(r,l′,i))
l′) = ⊥ for all l′ ≥ m. Since K′i(r
l, m) contains only points
fromRl
′
for l′ ≥ m, we get that Pl′(rl,m,i)([[φ]](rl ,m,i)) = ⊥. Thus, we conclude that (I
′, rl, m) |=
φ →i ψ in this case. Now suppose that Pl(r,m,i)([[φ ∧ ψ]](r,m,i)) > Pl(r,m,i)([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]](r,m,i)). If
we could show that (R([[φ]](r,m,i)))
m = R′([[φ]](rl,m,i)) ∩ R
m, and similarly for ψ, then we
could apply the argument of the previous paragraph to show that Pl′(rl,m,i)([[φ ∧ ψ]](rl,m,i)) >
Pl′(rl,m,i)([[φ∧¬ψ]](rl ,m,i)). This, in turn, would allow us to conclude that (I
′, rl, m) |= φ→i ψ.
The fact that (R([[φ]](r,m,i)))
m = R′([[φ]](rl,m,i)) ∩ R
m follows from the following chain of
equivalences:
sm ∈ (R([[φ]](r,m,i)))
m
iff (s,m) ∈ [[φ]](r,m,i)
iff (s,m) ∈ W(r,m,i) and (I, s,m) |= φ
iff sm ∈ (R(W(r,m,i)))
m = Rm(r,i) and (by the induction hypothesis) (I
′, sm, m) |= φ
iff (sm, m) ∈ W(rl,m,i) and (I
′, sm, m) |= φ
iff (sm, m) ∈ [[φ]](rl,m,i)
iff sm ∈ R([[φ]](rl,m,i)) ∩R
m.
Thus, in either case, we conclude that (I ′, rl, m) |= φ→i ψ, as desired.
For the converse, suppose that (I, r,m) 6|= φ →i ψ. Then Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) > ⊥ and
Pl(r,m,i)([[φ ∧ ψ]](r,m,i)) 6> Pl(r,m,i)([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]](r,m,i)). By the same arguments as above, we get
that Pl′(rl,m,i)([[φ ∧ ψ]](rl,m,i)) > ⊥ and Pl
′
(rl,m,i)([[φ ∧ ψ]](rl,m,i)) 6> Pl
′
(rl,m,i)([[φ ∧ ¬ψ]](rl ,m,i)).
Thus, (I ′, rl, m) 6|= φ→i ψ, as desired.
Finally, for r ∈ R, define f(r) = r∞. We have proved that if φ ∈ LKC, then (I, r,m) |= φ
if and only if (I ′, f(r), m) |= φ. Since this holds for all m, a straightforward argument
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by induction on structure shows that this holds, not just for formulas in LKC, but for all
temporally linear formulas.
We now have to ensure that I ′ satisfies A. Suppose that I satisfies QUAL. Thus, Pi(r,m)
is qualitative for all agents i, runs r ∈ R, and times m. Using part (b) of Lemma 35, we
conclude that the prior P ′(r,i) is qualitative for all agents i and runs r ∈ R. This implies,
using Proposition 29, that I ′ satisfies QUAL. Similarly, if I satisfies RANK, using part (c)
of Lemma 35 and Proposition 29, we get that I ′ satisfies RANK.
Suppose that I satisfies NORM. Then Pl(r,m,i)([[true]] > ⊥ for all agents i, runs r ∈ R, and
times m. This implies that ¬(true →i false) is valid in I. Suppose that l ≥ m. Then since
¬(true →i false) ∈ L
KC, we conclude from the proof above that (I ′, rl, m) |= ¬(true →i
false). Thus, Pl′(rl,m,i)([[true]](rl,m,i)) > ⊥. Suppose that l < m. By definition, we have that
R′(K′i(r
l, m)) = (R(Ki(r, l)))
l. Using part (e) of Lemma 35, we get that P ′(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)) is
isomorphic to P l(r,i). However, the latter plausibility space is isomorphic to Pi(r, l). Thus, it
satisfies ⊤ > ⊥. We conclude that I ′ satisfies NORM, as desired.
Up to now we have assumed that REF is not in A. If REF is in A, then REF does not hold for
A, although it does hold at many points. To understand the issue, suppose that REF holds
in I. Since I ′ satisfies PRIOR, to show that REF holds in I ′, according to Proposition 29
it suffices to show that all priors satisfy REF. This is indeed the case if l 6=∞. For suppose
that rl ∈ A ⊆ R′. We want to show that Pl(rl,i)(A) > ⊥. Recall that P
′
(rl,i) = ⊕mP
m
(r,i). From
the definition of ⊕, it easily follows that if Pll(r,i)(A ∩ R
l) > ⊥, then Pl′(rl,i)(A) > ⊥. By
definition, we have that Pl′(rl,i)(A ∩ R
l) = Pl(r,l,i)(A
′), where A′ = {(s, l) : sl ∈ A}. Clearly
(r, l) ∈ A′, since (rl, m) ∈ A. Since I satisfies REF, we must have that Pl(r,l,i)(A
′) > ⊥. It
follows that Pl′(rl,i) satisfies REF if l 6= ∞. This argument breaks down if l = ∞. Indeed, it
is clear that P ′(r∞,i) does not satisfy REF. Since R
∞ is disjoint from Rm for m <∞, and we
only “sum” Pm(r,i) for m <∞ to obtain P
′
(r∞,i), it follows that R
∞ is disjoint from W ′(r∞,i), so
REF does not hold.
Fortunately, a slight modification of the construction of I ′ can be used to deal with the case
REF ∈ A. Define P∞(r,i) = (R
∞
(r,i),Pl
∞
(r,i)), where R
∞
(r,i) = {r
∞} and Pl∞(r,i)({r
∞}) > ⊥. Modify
the construction of I ′ so that the prior of agent i in run rl is P ′′(rl,i) = P
′
(rl,i) ⊕P
∞
(rl,i). (Thus,
P ′′(rl,i) = ⊕m≤∞P
m
(rl,i).) It is easy to check that I
′ now does satisfy REF. The argument in the
case that l 6= ∞ remains unchanged. On the other hand, if r∞ ∈ A ⊆ R′, it is immediate
that P∞(A ∩ R∞) > ⊥, so we can now deal with this case as well. If QUAL, RANK, or
NORM is in A, it is easy to see (using the same argument as above) that I ′ also satisfies
QUAL, RANK, or NORM.
It remains to show that this modification of the prior does not affect the evaluation of
formulas. That is, we must show that (I, r,m) |= φ if and only if (I ′, rl, m) |= φ for all
l ≥ m. Again, we proceed by induction on the structure of formulas. The argument for
formulas of the form Kiφ goes through unchanged, since the changes to Pl
′ did not affect
the Ki relations. The argument for formulas of the form φ →i ψ goes through with almost
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no change. The only case that requires attention is if (I, r,m) |= φ→i ψ and [[φ]](r,m,i) = ⊥.
Our earlier arguments showed that Pll
′
(r,i)((R([[φ]](r,m,i))
l′ ∩ R(W(r,l′,i)))
l′) = ⊥ for all l′ ≥ m,
l′ 6=∞. These arguments go through without change. We must now show that this also holds
if l′ = ∞. But, from the definition of Pl∞, we get that Pl∞(r,i)((R([[φ]](r,m,i))
∞ ∩ R∞) = ⊥
unless r∞ ∈ R([[φ]](r,m,i))
∞. This implies that (r,m) ∈ [[φ]](r,m,i). But this cannot happen,
since Pl(r,m,i)([[φ]](r,m,i)) = ⊥ and I satisfies REF. ✷
Theorem 34: Let A be a subset of {QUAL,NORM,REF, SDP,UNIF,RANK} and let I
be a coherent synchronous system satisfying perfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and A. Then
there is a synchronous system I ′ satisfying perfect recall, PRIOR, and A, and a mapping
f : R 7→ R′ such that for all temporally linear formulas φ ∈ LKCT , (I, r,m) |= φ if and only
if (I ′, f(r), m) |= φ.
PROOF. Suppose that I = (R, π,P1, . . . ,Pn) is a coherent synchronous system satisfy-
ing perfect recall, CONS, PERSIST, and A. If neither CONS nor UNIF are in A, then
Theorem 32 guarantees that there is a system I ′ that satisfies the stated properties.
Suppose that UNIF ∈ A, but SDP,REF /∈ A. (We sketch the modifications required to
deal with SDP and REF below.) It does not follow that the system I ′ constructed in the
proof satisfies UNIF. To see why, suppose r, r′ and m > k are such that (r′, k) ∈ W(r,k,i) but
(r,m) 6∼i (r
′, m). UNIF implies that Pi(r, k) = Pi(r
′, k) and (since I also satisfies CONS)
thatW(r,m,i)∩W(r′,m,i) = ∅. Hence, our construction guarantees that P
′
(rk ,i) 6= P
′
(r′k ,i), although
r′k ∈ W ′(rk,i). Thus, the prior in I
′ does not satisfy UNIF. It follows that I ′ does not satisfy
UNIF either, for P ′i(r
k, k) 6= P ′i(r
′k, k), although (r′k, k) ∈ W ′(rk,k,i).
The solution to this problem is relatively straightforward. We modify our construction so
that the prior does indeed satisfy UNIF. In particular, we modify the prior P ′ to ensure that
if Pi(r, k) = Pi(r
′, k), then P ′(rk ,i) = P
′
(r′k ,k). Of course, we have to do so carefully, so as to
make sure that nothing goes wrong with the rest of the argument in Theorem 32.
We start with a modification of the construction of ⊕ that takes sets (rather than sequences)
of plausibility spaces and returns a new plausibility space.
Lemma 36 Let S be a set of plausibility spaces such that the sets {W : (W,Pl) ∈ S} are
pairwise disjoint. Then there is a plausibility space ⊗S such that
(a) if S = (W,Pl) ∈ S, then ⊗S|W is isomorphic to S under the identity mapping,
(b) if S is qualitative for all S ∈ S, then ⊗S is qualitative,
(c) if S is ranked for all S ∈ S, then ⊗S is ranked.
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PROOF. Without loss of generality there is an ordinal λ and a sequence {Si : 0 ≤ i < λ}
such that Si ∈ S for all i, and for all S ∈ S, exists an i such that S = Si.
17 Define
⊗S = ⊕iSi. Part (a) of Lemma 35 guarantees that ⊗S is a plausibility space. Parts (a), (b),
and (c) follow immediately from parts (e), (b), and (c) of Lemma 35, respectively. ✷
Recall that to satisfy UNIF and PRIOR, it suffices to find a partition of R such that all
the runs in each cell have the same prior. We now examine a possible way of partitioning
the runs in the system. Let r ∈ R. Define [r,m]i = {(r
′, m) : (r′, m) ∼i (r,m),Pi(r
′, m) =
Pi(r,m)}. Thus, [r,m]i is the set of points in which agent i has the same knowledge state and
plausibility assessment as at (r,m). (Note that if W(r,m,i) 6= ∅, then since I satisfies CONS,
Pi(r
′, m) = Pi(r,m) implies that (r
′, m) ∼i (r,m).)
Lemma 37(a) For all times m, the collection {R([r,m]i) : r ∈ R} is a partition of R.
(b) For all times m and runs r, W(r,m,i) ⊆ [r,m]i.
(c) For all times m and runs r, R([r,m+ 1]i) ⊆ R([r,m]i).
(d) For all times m and runs r, r′ such that (r′, 0) ∈ [r, 0]i, if (r
′, m) ∼i (r,m), then (r
′, m) ∈
[r,m]i.
PROOF. By definition, if (r′, m) ∈ [r,m]i, then [r
′, m] = [r,m]i. Thus, if [r,m]i 6= [r
′, m]i,
then [r,m]i ∩ [r
′, m]i = ∅. Part (a) follows immediately. For part (b), suppose that (r
′, m) ∈
W(r,m,i). Since I satisfies CONS, we have that (r
′, m) ∼i (r,m). Moreover, since I satisfies
UNIF, we have that Pi(r
′, m) = Pi(r,m). Thus, (r
′, m) ∈ [r,m]i. We conclude thatW(r,m,i) ⊆
[r,m]i, as desired. For part (c), suppose that (r
′, m + 1) ∈ [r,m + 1]i. This implies that
(r′, m+1) ∼i (r,m+1) and Pi(r
′, m+1) = Pi(r,m+1). Since I satisfies perfect recall, we get
that (r′, m) ∼i (r,m). Moreover, since I satisfies PERSIST, we get that Pi(r
′, m) = Pi(r,m).
We conclude that (r′, m) ∈ [r,m]i. Thus, R([r,m+ 1]i) ⊆ R([r,m]i), as desired. Finally, we
prove part (d) by induction on m. When m = 0, part (d) obviously holds. Suppose that
m > 0, (r′, 0) ∈ [r, 0]i, and (r
′, m) ∼i (r,m). Since I satisfies perfect recall, we have that
(r′, m− 1) ∼i (r,m− 1). Using the induction hypothesis, we get that (r
′, m− 1) ∈ [r,m− 1].
This implies that Pi(r
′, m−1) = Pi(r,m−1). Using PERSIST, we conclude that Pi(r
′, m) =
Pi(r,m). Thus, (r
′, m) ∈ [r,m]i, as desired. ✷
Using both ⊕ and ⊗, we now construct a prior over R′ that satisfies UNIF. For r ∈ R, let
[r]i abbreviate R([r, 0]i). Define P
m
[r]i
= ⊗{Pm(r′,i) : r
′ ∈ [r]i}, where P
m
(r,i) = (R
m
(r,i),Pl
m
(r,i))
is the prior defined in the proof of Theorem 32 that is isomorphic to Pi(r,m) under the
mapping r′m 7→ (r′, m). We must show that Pm(r,i) is well defined; that is, we must show that
if Pm(r′,i) 6= P
m
(r′′,i), then R
m
(r′,i) is disjoint from R
m
(r′′,i). Note that if (r
′, m) ∈ [r′′, m]i, then
Pm(r′,i) and P
m
(r′′,i) are identical. Using part (b) of Lemma 37 we get that if (r
′, m) 6∈ [r′′, m]i,
17 If S is uncountable, this construction may require the axiom of choice. There is a variant of the
construction that does not require the axiom of choice, but the additional complexities involved do
not seem worth the trouble.
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then Rm(r′,i)∩R
m
(r′′,i) = ∅, as desired. Thus, P
m
[r]i
is indeed well defined. We now define P ′(rl,i) =
⊕mP
m
[r]i
as the prior of agent i in run rl.
We claim that this family of priors satisfies UNIF. Notice that W ′(rl,i) = ∪m,r′∈[r]iR
m
(r′,i). If
r′m ∈ W ′(rl,i) then, by definition, r
′ ∈ W(r,m,i). Using parts (a) and (b) of Lemma 37, we get
that r′ ∈ [r]i. It easily follows that [r
′]i = [r]i, so indeed the construction guarantees that
P ′(rl,i) = P
′
(r′m,i), as desired. Since the family of priors satisfies UNIF, so does I
′.
Let φ ∈ LKC and l ≥ m. As in the proof of Theorem 32, we now proceed by induction on
the structure of formulas to show that (I ′, rl, m) |= φ if and only if (I, r,m) |= φ. The only
difference arises in dealing with the →i modality.
As before, parts (d) and (f) of Lemma 35 imply that P ′(rl,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)) is isomorphic to
⊕k≥m(P
k
[r]i
|R′(K′
i
(rl,m))). Again, we consider the first term in the “sum”, P
m
[r]i
|R′(K′
i
(rl,m)). We
want to show that Pm[r]i|R′(K′i(rl,m)) = P
m
(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)). Recall that P
m
(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)) is the first
term in the analogous “sum” in the proof of Theorem 32. Thus, even though we are using
a different prior from that of the proof of Theorem 32, after conditioning, they are essen-
tially the same. By Lemma 36, we have that Pm[r]i|Rm(r,i) = P
m
(r,i). Thus, it suffices to show
that ∪r′∈[r]iR
m
(r′,i) ∩ R
′(K′i(r
l, m)) = Rm(r,i) ∩ R
′(K′i(r
l, m). The inclusion from right to left is
immediate. For the opposite inclusion, suppose that sm ∈ ∪r′∈[r]iR
m
(r′,i)∩R
′(K′i(r
l, m)). Since
sm ∈ R′(K′i(r
l, m)), we must have (r,m) ∼i (s,m). Since s
m ∈ ∪r′∈[r]iR
m
(r′,i), there must also
be some run r′ ∈ [r]i such that s ∈ R
m
(r′,i). Since s ∈ R
m(r′, i), we have that (s,m) ∈ W(r′,m,i).
By part (b) of Lemma 37, (s,m) ∈ [r′, m]i. By part (c) of Lemma 37, we get that (s, 0) ∈
[r′, 0]i. Since (r
′, 0) ∈ [r, 0]i, it immediately follows that [r
′, 0]i = [r, 0]i. Hence, (s, 0) ∈ [r, 0]i.
Now by part (d) of Lemma 37, we get that (s,m) ∈ [r,m]i. Thus, Pi(s,m) = Pi(r,m).
Since I satisfies UNIF and (s,m) ∈ W(r′,m,i), it follows that Pi(s,m) = Pi(r
′, m). Hence,
(s,m) ∈ W(r,m,i). Finally, we can conclude that s ∈ R
m
(r,i), as desired. Given this equivalence,
we can deal with the →i case just as we did in the proof of Theorem 32.
Finally, we need to ensure that I ′ satisfies A. The proof of Theorem 32 shows that if I
satisfies NORM, then so does I ′. Using parts (b) and (c) of Lemma 36, it easily follows that
if I satisfies QUAL or RANK, then so does I ′.
If REF and UNIF are both in A (but SDP is not), then we need a further modification of
the prior, in the same spirit of that in the proof of Theorem 32. Define P∞[r]i = ([r]
∞
i ,Pl
∞
[r]i
),
where Pl∞[r]i(∅) = ⊥ and Pl
∞
[r]i
(A) = ⊤ for all A 6= ∅. We now take the prior of the agent to be
P ′′(rl,i) = P
′
(rl,i) ⊕ P
∞
[r]i
. It is straightforward to show that the resulting system satisfies REF
and the requirements of the theorem, using essentially the same arguments for dealing with
REF as in the proof of Theorem 32.
Finally, suppose SDP ∈ A but REF is not. Note that, since CONS and SDP imply UNIF,
I satisfies UNIF, so we can assume without loss of generality that UNIF is also in A. To
get I ′ to satisfy SDP, we further modify P ′ so that it depends only on the agent, and not
the run. Thus, we define Pmi = ⊗{P
m
[r]i
: r ∈ R}, and define P ′(rl,i) = ⊕mP
m
i . Clearly,
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with this prior, I ′ satisfies SDP. Again, we need to check that this change in prior does
not affect the rest of our argument. Once more, the only difficulty comes in dealing with
the →i case. Just as in the case of UNIF, we proceed by showing that P
m
i |R′(K′i(rl,m)) =
Pm(r,i)|R′(K′i(rl,m)). The argument is actually even easier than that for UNIF: We show that
∪r′R
m
(r′,i) ∩ R
′(K′i(r
l, m)) = Rm(r,i) ∩ R
′(K′i(r
l, m). Again, the inclusion from right to left is
immediate. For the opposite inclusion, suppose that sm ∈ ∪r′R
m
(r′,i) ∩ R
′(K′i(r
l, m)). Since
sm ∈ R′(K′i(r
l, m)), we must have (r,m) ∼i (s,m). Since s
m ∈ ∪r′R
m
(r′,i), there must also be
some run r′ such that s ∈ Rm(r′,i). Thus, (s,m) ∈ W(r′,m,i). Since I satisfies CONS, we have
(s,m) ∼i (r
′, m). It follows that (r′, m) ∼i (r,m). Since I satisfies SDP, we must have that
W(r,m,i) = W(r′,m,i), so (s,m) ∈ W(r,m,i). Therefore, s ∈ R
m
(r,i), as desired.
The modifications to deal with the case where both SDP and REF are in A are identical to
the case with UNIF, and are omitted here. ✷
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